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This paper investigates the extent and ways in which childhood school quality factors causally influence
subsequent adult socioeconomic and health outcomes. The study analyzes the life trajectories of children
born between 1950 and 1970, and followed through 2007, using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The PSID data are linked with multiple data sources that describe the neighborhood attributes
and school quality resources that prevailed at the time these children were growing up.
I estimate the long-run impacts of court-ordered school desegregation plans on adult attainments by
exploiting quasi-random variation in the timing of initial court orders, which generated differences
in the timing and scope of the implementation of these plans during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. Difference-in-
differences estimates, sibling-difference estimates, and 2SLS/IV estimates indicate that school desegregation
and the accompanied increases in school quality resulted in significant improvements in adult attainments
for blacks. I find that, for blacks, school desegregation significantly increased educational attainment
and adult earnings, reduced the probability of incarceration, and improved adult health status; desegregation
had no effects on whites across each of these outcomes. The results suggest that the mechanisms through
which school desegregation led to beneficial adult attainment outcomes for blacks include improvement
in access to school resources reflected in reductions in class size and increases in per-pupil spending.
This narrowed black-white adult socioeconomic and health disparities for the cohorts exposed to integrated
schools during childhood. The results highlight the significant impacts of educational attainment on
future health status and risk of incarceration, and point to the importance of school quality in influencing
socioeconomic mobility prospects, which in turn have far-reaching impacts on health.
Rucker C. Johnson
Goldman School of Public Policy
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Racial segregation that results in race differences in access to school quality has often 
been cited as perpetuating inequality in attainment outcomes. Since the landmark 1954 Supreme 
Court Brown v. Board of Education decision and subsequent court-ordered implementation of 
school desegregation plans during the 1960s, 70s and 80s, scholars have investigated the 
consequences of school desegregation on socioeconomic attainment outcomes of black children 
(Clotfelter, 2004). However, no large-scale data collection effort was undertaken to investigate 
school desegregation program effects, particularly on longer-run outcomes.  
While many prior studies have examined the effects of school resources on test scores 
and more proximate student achievement outcomes, less evidence is available on how school 
quality influences socioeconomic attainments at mid-adulthood ages using longitudinal data. Still 
fewer studies have documented how school resources might influence adult health status via 
their impacts on educational attainment and adult economic status.    
This paper investigates the extent and mechanisms by which childhood school quality 
factors causally influence subsequent adult socioeconomic and health outcomes. The primary 
difficulty in disentangling the relative importance of childhood family, neighborhood, and school 
quality factors is isolating variation in school quality characteristics that are unrelated to family 
and neighborhood factors.  
This study analyzes the life trajectories of children who were born between 1950 and 
1975 and have been followed through 2007, using the longest-running US nationally-
representative longitudinal data spanning four decades.
1 To this data, I link information from 
multiple data sources that contain detailed neighborhood attributes and school quality resources 
that prevailed at the time these children were growing up. I also obtained a comprehensive 
desegregation case inventory for the years between 1954 and 1990 that contains detailed 
information for every US school district that implemented a court-ordered desegregation plan, 
the year of the initial court order, and the type of desegregation court order.
2 The implementation 
of court-ordered school desegregation plans during the childhoods of these birth cohorts provides 
a unique opportunity to evaluate their long-run impacts.      
The analysis was conducted in three stages. First, I estimated models of the predictors of 
the timing of initial desegregation court orders, which serves to demonstrate the exogeneity of 
the “treatment”. I show that collectively the pre-treatment school quality, SES, demographic, and   2
labor market related characteristics do not significantly (jointly) predict the year of the initial 
court order (Appendix B). Second, I present new evidence of how court-ordered school 
desegregation influenced the quantity and quality of educational inputs received by minority 
children. Utilizing an event-study research design, the primary identification strategy uses 
variation in the timing and scope of desegregation plan implementation that was induced by the 
quasi-random variation in the timing of initial court orders. I find that desegregation plans were 
effective in narrowing black-white gaps in per-pupil school spending and class size and 
decreasing school segregation. Third, I investigate the long-run impacts of the court-ordered 
desegregation plans on subsequent attainment outcomes, including educational attainment, adult 
earnings, income and poverty status, probability of incarceration, and adult health status. I 
exploit the wide variation in the timing and scope of implementation of desegregation plans to 
identify their effects.  
School desegregation and the accompanied increases in school quality resulted in 
significant improvements in adult attainments for blacks. I find that, for blacks, school 
desegregation significantly increased educational attainment and adult earnings, reduced the 
probability of incarceration, and improved adult health status; desegregation had no effects on 
whites across each of these outcomes. The results suggest that the mechanisms through which 
school desegregation led to beneficial adult attainment outcomes for blacks include improvement 
in access to school resources reflected in reductions in class size and increases in per-pupil 
spending.  
As an alternative empirical strategy, I use sibling comparisons to identify the effects of 
school quality and school desegregation on adult socioeconomic and health outcomes. I estimate 
within-family effects of school quality inputs on later-life health. I exploit policy-induced 
changes in per-pupil spending and school resources that are unrelated to child family- and 
neighborhood-level determinants of adult economic and health status. This identification strategy 
compares the adult outcomes of individuals who were exposed to integrated schools during 
childhood with the corresponding adult outcomes of their siblings (evaluated at the same age) 
who grew up in the same communities but who had already reached age 18 prior to the 
desegregation plan implementation or who were exposed to integrated schools for only a limited 
period of their childhood, conditional on year of birth effects. The pattern of results is similar 
across all of the empirical approaches (difference-in-difference, sibling fixed effect, and   3
2SLS/IV models), and reveals significant long-run impacts of school desegregation and school 
quality on a broad range of adult outcomes. This narrowed black-white adult socioeconomic and 
health disparities for the cohorts exposed to integrated schools during childhood.    
The empirical analysis makes three unique contributions by investigating (1) non-racial 
integration aspects of court-ordered desegregation through its impacts on per-pupil spending; (2) 
the effects of court-ordered desegregation plans of public schools on adult SES and health 
outcomes and attempts to separately identify the effects of neighborhood and school quality; and 
(3) the role of childhood school and neighborhood quality in contributing to socioeconomic and 
racial health disparities in adulthood. By examining life course effects of school desegregation 
across a broad range of subsequent outcomes, I attempt to shed light on the mechanisms through 
which differences in school quality translate into differences in adult outcomes.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The focus of the next section is the 
analysis of the effects of school desegregation on school quality inputs (per-pupil spending; class 
size; school segregation). This informs what the typical “treatment” represented for the average 
black child. The data and measures used to evaluate the long-run impacts on adult outcomes are 
described in section III. Section IV discusses the empirical strategy, econometric model, and 
estimation methods. The long-run results are presented in section V. This includes subsections 
that a) attempt to rule out competing explanations and violations of the identifying assumptions; 
b) evaluate the robustness of the results and explore their sensitivity to alternative functional 
form, specification tests, and alternative empirical strategies (with different underlying 
identification assumptions); and c) involve specifications that attempt to explore potential 
mechanisms. Summary discussion to put the magnitudes in perspective in relation to previous 
studies and concluding statements are provided in the final section. 
II. USING THE TIMING OF COURT-ORDERED DESEGREGATION AS A QUASI-EXPERIMENT 
It is hypothesized that school desegregation may have long-run impacts on the adult 
economic and health status of African Americans through several potential mechanisms: (1) 
school quality resource effects (e.g., the distribution and level of per-pupil spending, class size, 
teacher quality); (2) peer exposure effects (e.g., children in classrooms with highly motivated and 
high-achieving students are likely to perform better due to positive spillover effects on other 
students in the classroom); and (3) effects on parental, teacher, and community-level 
expectations of child achievement. The long-run effects of each hypothesized mechanism operate   4
via their influence on the quality and quantity of educational attainment. I examine the 
hypothesized primary mechanism: changes in school quality resulting from abrupt shifts in racial 
school segregation.
3  
An understanding of the causes of the timing of desegregation is critical to the 
identification strategy. Accordingly, Appendix B provides a brief history of school desegregation 
litigation and implementation with an eye towards identification issues and demonstrating the 
validity of the research design—namely, the quasi-random timing of initial court orders. This 
appendix includes analysis of school desegregation policy to describe aspects of the nature and 
timing of steps taken to desegregate the schools. I briefly summarize the key insights that 
emerged from this analysis.  
In order to document the substantial variation in the timing and intensity of school 
desegregation efforts, I use a comprehensive desegregation case inventory compiled by legal 
scholars for the years between 1954 and 1990 that contains detailed information for every US 
school district that implemented a court-ordered desegregation plan, in conjunction with 
additional data from Welch and Light (1987) on the dates of major desegregation plan 
implementation for large urban districts.
4  Figure A2 presents the dates of initial court orders and 
resultant major school desegregation plan implementation across the country among the 1,057 
school districts that introduced such plans between 1954 and 1980. Districts exhibit a great deal 
of variation in the year in which the initial court order was issued and the subsequent timing 
when major desegregation plan implementation actually took place; this variation is evidenced 
both within and across regions of the country (see Figures A1-A5).    
Most school districts did not adopt major school desegregation plans until forced to do so 
by court order (or threat of litigation) due to individual cases filed in local Federal court. The 
importance of legal precedent caused the NAACP to strategically bring suits first, and foremost, 
when and where there was the greatest likelihood of winning, not where the largest potential 
gains from desegregation could be achieved for a particular local community at a point in time. 
Enforcement of desegregation did not begin in earnest until the mid-1960s. State and 
federal dollars proved to be the most effective incentives to desegregate the schools. A critical 
turning point was the enactment of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA) and Title I funds 
of the 1965 Elementary & Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which prohibited federal aid to 
segregated schools and allowed the Justice Department to join suits against school districts that   5
were in violation of the Brown vs. Board order to integrate. This Act dramatically raised the 
amount of federal aid to education from a few million to more than one billion dollars a year; 
and, for the first time, the threat of withholding federal funds became a powerful inducement to 
comply with federal desegregation orders (Cascio et al., 2010; Holland, 2004). This resulted in a 
significant drop in the extent of racial school segregation thereafter reinforced by local Federal 
courts. Thus, there is a sharp post-1965 discontinuity in school desegregation.  
This pattern and discontinuity after 1965 is also evident in the time lag between initial 
court order and major desegregation plan implementation, which occurs in the South and non-
South (Figure A3). For initial court orders meted out after 1965, there is immediate 
implementation (on average, major plan implemented within 1-2 yrs of initial court order); and 
the lag does not differ over time for court orders after 1965. On the other hand, for initial court 
orders meted out before 1965, there is more than a 10-year delay in implementation of a major 
plan (i.e., there is a systematic long delay that decreases in years leading up to 1965).  
Litigation and desegregation plan implementation accelerated substantially between 1964 
and 1972. For example, only 6 percent of the districts that would eventually undergo court-
ordered desegregation had implemented major plans by 1968 (when the PSID began); by 1972 
this rose to over 56 percent. It is this period of substantial growth in litigation activity, spurred by 
landmark court cases like the 1968 Green decision (which required immediate actions to 
effectively implement desegregation plans), that forms the basis of the research design. 
The process became highly decentralized with a diverse set of agents that initiated court 
litigation following the Brown decision, which contributed to the idiosyncratic nature of the 
timing and location where legal challenges arose that resulted in initial court orders. This legal 
history of school desegregation is important because it illustrates the significant variation in both 
the timing, nature and scope of desegregation efforts; and most importantly for my research 
design purposes, a vast majority of this heterogeneity, particularly its timing, was driven by an 
assortment of idiosyncratic, exogenous factors. The key to the identification strategy pursued in 
this paper is thus to capitalize on this source of identifying variation. Differences across districts 
in when desegregation court cases were first filed and the length of time it took these cases to 
proceed through the judicial system represents a plausibly exogenous source of identifying 
variation in the timing of school desegregation. The exogeneity of this timing is supported   6
theoretically by the documented legal history of school desegregation and by my own empirical 
examination of the issue (see Appendix B for details). 
The primary identification strategy uses this variation in the timing of major 
desegregation plan implementation that was induced by differences in the year of the initial court 
order. Systematic variation in desegregation plan adoption could lead to spurious estimates of the 
plans’ impact if those same school district characteristics are associated with differential trends 
in the outcomes of interest. To explore this, I compiled characteristics of school districts in 1962, 
prior to the surge of court-ordered desegregation cases and significant integration efforts that 
ensued in subsequent years (of the same decade). I use these “pre” characteristics to predict the 
year in which the initial court order took place and the year in which the school district actually 
implemented a major desegregation plan, respectively. I find little evidence that pre-treatment 
characteristics significantly predict the timing of court orders (Table A1). 
On the other hand, I find that districts with a larger minority population, greater per-
capita school spending, and smaller proportion of residents with low income are each strongly 
associated with longer delays in major desegregation implementation following the initial court 
order. These results are consistent with the legal history of school desegregation, and suggest that 
the timing of initial court litigation is more plausibly exogenous than the timing of major 
desegregation plan implementation. In sum, the idiosyncratic nature of court litigation timing 
documented in the legal history of school desegregation makes a prima facie case for treating 
initial court orders as exogenous shocks, which influenced the timing of major desegregation 
plan implementation and generated changes in school quality from abrupt shifts in racial school 
segregation. This case is bolstered by the empirical evidence that the bulk of 1962 district/county 
characteristics fail to predict the timing of initial court orders. These findings inform the 
empirical approach used to identify school desegregation impacts.  
Estimating the Effects of Court-Ordered School Desegregation on School Resources. The 
first stage of the analysis investigates how court-ordered school desegregation influenced the 
quantity and quality of educational inputs received by minority children. I measure school 
quality as the purchased inputs to a school—per-pupil spending and the student-teacher ratio. 
Using the staggered timing of court-ordered school desegregation (and plan implementation) 
within an event study analysis (cf. Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993; McCrary, 2007), I 
quantify desegregation effects on school resources. I exploit the variation in the timing of court   7
orders in one set of models to analyze desegregation effects and exploit the variation in the 
timing of major desegregation plan implementation in the other set. Because of the 
aforementioned structural break in the lag between initial court order and desegregation plan 
implementation, the models that use the timing of initial court orders include an interaction term 
for pre-1965 court orders. The discussion of the models below applies similarly for the court 
order and plan implementation specifications.  
  A newly compiled school district panel dataset allows this analysis to exploit variation in 
the timing of initial court orders and subsequent desegregation plan implementation. The data 
includes measures from 1968-1982 Office of Civil Rights (OCR) data; 1962-1982 Census of 
Governments data; Common Core data (CCD) compiled by the National Center for Education 
Statistics; along with the comprehensive case inventory of court litigation regarding school 
desegregation over the entire 1955-1990 period (American Communities Project), and major 
plan implementation dates in large districts (compiled by Welch/Light). The desegregation court 
case data contains an entire case inventory of every school district ever subject to court 
desegregation orders. Every court case is coded according to whether it involved segregation of 
students across schools, whether the court required a desegregation remedy, and the main 
component of the desegregation plan.
5   
While data is available on the exact year(s) of major desegregation plan implementation 
following the initial court order on only this subset of districts, the combined data from the 
American Communities Project (Brown University) and Welch/Light provide the best available 
data that have been utilized to study this topic for three reasons. First, the year of the initial court 
order (available for all districts) is plausibly more exogenous than the exact year in which a 
major desegregation plan was implemented because opposition groups to integration can delay 
major desegregation plan implementation by lengthening the court proceedings or by 
implementing inadequate desegregation plans. And, court-ordered desegregation by legal 
mandate is plausibly more exogenous than other more voluntary forms of desegregation. Second, 
the date of the initial court order is precisely measured for all districts, as is the year of major 
desegregation plan implementation for the 125 large school districts from Welch/Light. Third, in 
the large districts for which information is available on both the year of the initial court order 
along with the year of major desegregation plan implementation, the initial implementation year   8
of major desegregation plans resulted in the single largest decline in racial school segregation 
that the district experienced.  
The event study framework compares school district per-pupil spending, student-to-
teacher ratios, and school segregation levels in the years immediately after court-ordered 
desegregation to the levels that prevailed in the years immediately before court orders (plan 
implementation) for districts that underwent court-orders at some point during the 1960s or 70s. 
The analysis exploits plausibly exogenous determinants in the timing of initial court orders (and 
desegregation plan implementation in a subset of analyses) to estimate the following event study 
equation, 
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where  t c Y ,  is per-pupil spending, student-to-teacher ratio, segregation dissimilarity index or 
black-white exposure index in school district c in year t=1962,…,1982;  c θ  is a set of school 
district fixed effects;  t c r ), ( γ  is a set of year fixed effects or region-by-year fixed effects; and  ct X  
is a column vector including a constant and school district demographic characteristics.  c D  is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the school district ever implemented a desegregation plan, and 
the indicator function,  () 1 , is equal to one when the year of observation is y = -5, -4,…, 1,…,6, 
years removed from the date, 
*
c T , when school district c was first issued the court order (or 
implemented a desegregation plan for a subset of analyses) (y=0 is omitted).
6      
  The point estimates of interest,  y π  and  y τ , are identified using variation in the timing of 
desegregation plan implementation. Because the indicator for y = 0 is omitted,  y π  is interpreted 
as the average difference in outcomes y years before the plan was implemented, and  y τ is the 
average difference in outcomes y years after the desegregation plan was implemented. Estimates 
of  y π  allow a visual and statistical evaluation of the potential importance of pre-treatment, time-
varying school district-level, unobservables; estimates of  y τ  allow the post-treatment dynamics 
to be explored. The  y π  and  y τ  vectors traces out the (equilibrium) adjustment path for school 
resource inputs from the pre-desegregation plan period to the implementation of plans—allowing   9
for possibility that efficacy of desegregation plans may erode over the long-run due to “white 
flight” (private school attendance or movement out of the district).
7 
A key asset of this identification strategy is that estimates of  y π  and  y τ  will be unbiased 
even if there are pre-existing and permanent differences between school districts that 
implemented desegregation plans and those that did not. The school district fixed effects control 
for time-invariant community characteristics such as preferences for racial integration and 
education. With the inclusion of region-by-year fixed effects, the estimates will provide unbiased 
estimates of the impact of court-ordered school desegregation plans even if regions varied in 
their K-12 education policies or their average level of funding support from year to year. 
Additionally, time-varying, community-level characteristics and measures of government 
transfers adjust the estimates for observed differences in characteristics and changes in federal 
programs. The regression models are weighted by black student enrollment to yield estimates 
that are representative of the impacts for the average black child. If I instead treat individual 
school districts as the observational unit and estimate unweighted regressions, then the estimates 
will represent the impact experienced for the average school district. While this parameter is 
intriguing, I am most interested in documenting the impacts of school desegregation for the 
average black student. I make sure the results are robust to the use of a balanced panel to avoid 
confusing the time path of how communities respond to desegregation with changes in the 
composition of school districts in the analytic sample. The standard errors are clustered at the 
school district level to account for serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004).
8 
School desegregation efforts occurred against the backdrop of the broader civil rights 
movement and overlapped the same period as federal “War on Poverty” initiatives were 
implemented.
9  To control for the possible coincident expansion of other programs, I include 
measures of childhood county per capita transfer payments for cash income support, medical 
care, and retirement and disability programs (that prevailed during their school-age years). Both 
the models that examine impacts on school quality inputs and the models that examine long-run 
impacts on adult outcomes (Section V) include these controls for childhood county per capita 
transfer payments from income-support programs.
10 
The Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans. I build on the findings of Welch and 
Light (1987), Guryan (2004), Reber (2005), and Weiner et al. (2008) by first analyzing the 
effectiveness of desegregation court-orders in reducing the extent of racial school segregation. I   10
then extend these findings to show that in the years leading up to and immediately following 
implementation, desegregation court-orders (plan implementation) had notable impacts on two 
key school quality resource indicators among blacks—1) increases in per-pupil spending and 2) 
reductions in the student-to-teacher ratio. These results are presented in Figures 1-3. The figures 
plot the regression coefficients on indicator variables for years before and after desegregation 
orders are enacted (year before initial court-order (implementation) is the reference category) on 
school district racial segregation, per-pupil spending, and the student-to-teacher ratio, 
respectively. The changes are all statistically significant. These models include school district 
fixed effects and region-specific year effects. The figures show effects induced by desegregation 
court-orders that represent post-1964 court orders (the interaction terms for pre-1965 court orders 
reveal that, due to the significant lag between initial court orders and major plan implementation 
during the pre-’65 legal/enforcement regime, effects during the early desegregation era were 
much smaller).   
Reduction of Segregation within School Districts. The extent of segregation within 
districts diminished sharply during the period 1968-72. The changes were greatest in the 
Southeast, which had a smaller proportion of highly segregated districts in 1972 than any region 
of the country. As shown in Figure 1 (top left graph), following court desegregation orders, there 
is a sharp decline in the school district racial dissimilarity index, which ranges from zero to one, 
and represents the proportion of black students who would need to be reassigned to a different 
school for perfect integration to be achieved given the district’s overall racial composition. There 
is no evidence of pre-existing segregation trends in the school districts prior to the court orders. 
Such a trend, had it existed, would have raised concern about the validity of the approach. 
Within two years after implementation, the dissimilarity index dropped by roughly 0.2 which is a 
substantial and rapid decrease given the average black-white dissimilarity index in 1968 among 
school districts that had not yet implemented a desegregation plan was 0.83. The change in the 
dissimilarity index 4 years after the court order is equal to 36 percent of the average index in 
1970 and to a full standard deviation change in the level of school segregation (based on the 
1970 cross-sectional standard deviation of the index). Similarly, as shown in the lower left graph 
of Figure 1, we witness a parallel significant pattern for the black-white exposure index (an 
alternative measure of school segregation). A more immediate and even sharper decline in school   11
segregation (for both the dissimilarity index and the black-white exposure index) emerges when 
years before and after major desegregation plan implementation is analyzed.
11     
Increased Per-Pupil Spending. Figure 2 shows court-ordered desegregation effects on 
school district per-pupil spending, separately by revenue source (local; state; federal). The results 
indicate that, on average, school district per-pupil spending increased by nearly $1,000 by the 
end of the fourth year after court-ordered desegregation relative to the year immediately 
preceding the initial court order, which differed markedly from the trend leading up to the year 
these rulings went into effect. This is a substantial increase given that the average level of per-
pupil school spending in 1967 among districts that had not yet implemented a plan was $2,738 
(in 2000 dollars). Importantly, the large increase in school district per-pupil spending is driven 
solely by the infusion of state funds following the timing of court-ordered school desegregation 
(top graph in Figure 2). I do not find a similar pattern in districts that were not under court-order, 
nor is there a significant pre-existing time trend among the districts under court order prior to the 
year in which the order was issued. I find insignificant and negligible effects on per-pupil 
spending from local or federal sources.  
Recall that before school desegregation plans were enacted, school district spending, 
particularly in the South, was directed disproportionately to the majority-white schools within 
districts, which will not be reflected in the district-level spending data. A political economy 
explanation for these results is that state legislatures were under pressure to ensure that the level 
of school resources available to whites would not be negatively affected by integration. The 
larger the proportion of the school district’s students who were non-white, the larger was the 
share of school resources that may need to be redistributed toward minority students following 
school desegregation in the absence of an increase in state funding. As a result, states infused 
greater funds into districts undergoing desegregation to ensure the level that black students 
received could be leveled-up to the level whites were previously receiving (i.e., without affecting 
prevailing resource levels for white students).  
I test for this relationship empirically by estimating identical models of the level of 
school district per-pupil spending from state revenue sources on the timing of court-ordered 
desegregation (with the inclusion of school district fixed effects and region-specific year effects), 
separately for school districts with a small proportion of black students (<0.2) versus districts 
with a large proportion of black students (>0.35).
12  As shown in the bottom graph of Figure 2, I   12
find precisely this pattern: no significant changes in per-pupil school spending among districts 
that had a small proportion of black students; in contrast, we see substantial and statistically 
significant increases in per-pupil spending from state revenue sources among districts that had a 
large proportion of black students. 
Reductions in Class Size. Figure 3 provides supportive evidence of reduced average class 
size for blacks following desegregation court orders. The results for the student-teacher ratio do 
not exhibit any pre-existing time trend but fall sharply following implementation, with 
reductions in class size of about 3 to 4 students five years later. As a robustness check for the 
estimated court-order induced effects on school quality inputs, I alternatively used a balanced 
panel of school districts that includes districts only if they contributed to the identification of the 
entire vector of leads and lags of implementation impacts (i.e., districts that have school quality 
information in at least three years before and three years after implementation). The evidence 
shows that the increase in the treatment effect in the first 4 years after the court order is not a 
spurious result of the differing set of districts identifying the parameters.
13   
Models are weighted by baseline black student enrollment so that results can be 
interpreted as desegregation effect experienced by the average black child. Similarly, the results 
presented in the lower-left graph for whites is weighted by baseline white student enrollment, so 
that the results can be interpreted as desegregation effect experienced by the average white child. 
The results indicate no significant effects on the average class size among white students, while 
significant reductions were experienced in class size for the average black student. The lower 
right graph uses school-level data for the subset of years in which this information is available 
and models are weighted by black student enrollment at the school-level
14; the three other graphs 
use all years of data aggregated up to the school district level. These results are reinforced with 
the use of school-level data, which demonstrate identical patterns. More immediate and sharper 
reductions in average class size for blacks are found by analyzing the years immediately before 
and after major desegregation plan implementation (upper-right graph of Figure 3). The sharp 
trend break in school resource inputs (per-pupil spending, class size, school segregation) 
immediately following implementation of school desegregation plans strongly suggests the 
estimates reflect the causal impact of desegregation plans.
15   13
III. DATA AND MEASURES 
The primary micro dataset utilized is the restricted, confidential geocoded version of the 
PSID (1968-2007) with identifiers at the neighborhood block level in which children grew up.
16  
I then merge neighborhood and school information from multiple data sources on the conditions 
that prevailed in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s when these children were growing up. This includes 
measures from 1968-1982 Office of Civil Rights (OCR) data; 1960, 1970, 1980 Census data; 
1962-1982 Census of Governments data; Common Core data (CCD) compiled by the National 
Center for Education Statistics; Regional Economic Information System (REIS) data; as well as 
the comprehensive case inventory of court litigation regarding school desegregation over the 
entire 1955-1990 period (American Communities Project), and major plan implementation dates 
in large districts (compiled by Welch/Light). 
The selected sample consists of PSID sample members born between 1950 and 1975; 
these individuals were between 0 and 18 years old in one of the first six waves of interviewing 
and were between the ages of 37 and 57 in 2007. I include all information on them for each 
wave, 1968 to 2007.
17 The primary analyses use the original sample children born between 1951 
and 1970, which includes males and females. All analyses control for gender, given well-known 
differences in labor market and health outcomes for men and women. I include both the Survey 
Research Center (SRC) component and the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) component, 
commonly known as the “poverty sample,” of the PSID sample. Due to the oversampling of 
black and low-income families, 45 percent of the sample is black. I apply sample weights in all 
the analyses to produce nationally-representative estimates.    
School Measures. I use the census block as the definition of neighborhood, which 
comprises a smaller geographic area than previous studies utilize; and I match childhood 
residential location address histories to blocks and school district boundaries (the algorithm is 
outlined in Appendix A). Each record is merged with a set of school quality resource indicators 
for 1960-1990 (including per-pupil spending, class size) and measures of the extent of racial 
school segregation and school desegregation efforts at the school level.  
Sixty-five percent of the original sample PSID children followed into adulthood that are 
analyzed in this paper (i.e., 4,683 out of 7,212 children) grew up in a school district that 
underwent a desegregation litigation case sometime between 1950 and 1990. These children 
lived in 1,073 different neighborhoods from 186 different school districts, representing 33   14
different states (based on childhood residence in 1968). 82 percent of original sample black 
children followed into adulthood grew up in school districts that underwent a desegregation 
litigation case sometime between 1950 and 1990 (i.e., 2,914 out of 3,558 black children). The 
share of children exposed to school desegregation orders increases significantly with year of 
birth over the 1950-1975 birth cohorts analyzed in the PSID sample (Figure A7).  
I merged the school district expenditures data, information on student-teacher ratios, 
teacher salaries, and the constructed school segregation indices, to the PSID data using the 
census block/tract contained in the Geocode file at the 1968 survey interview. After combining 
information from the 5 data sources, the main sample (born between 1951 and 1970) contains 
130,402 person-year observations from 7,212 individuals from 2,383 childhood families, 1,658 
childhood neighborhoods, 349 school districts, representing 40 different states. The mean age is 
about 35 for most outcome measures considered, with age ranging from 20 to 57, and an average 
of 18 observations per person (of valid adult income observations). The appendices and 
Appendix Table D0 lists the sources and years of all data elements along with details of the PSID 
survey questions used to construct key measures. Appendix Table D1 contains sample 
descriptive statistics for childhood family- and neighborhood-level measures by race. 
Outcomes of interest. A broad range of adult outcomes are analyzed including 
educational attainment, adult earnings, wages, annual work hours, family income and poverty 
status (all expressed in real 2000 dollars), whether ever incarcerated, and adult health status. 
Given well-known gender differences in labor force participation rates and criminal involvement, 
the labor market and incarceration outcomes are presented only for men. The regression models 
estimated for other economic, education, and health outcomes include men and women, with 
controls for gender.  
The key adulthood health outcome examined is the general health status (GHS) question: 
“Would you say your health in general is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” This 
question was asked of household heads and wives (if present) in each survey between 1984 and 
2007, and was asked of all family members in 1986.
18 GHS is highly predictive of morbidity 
measured in clinical surveys, and it is a powerful predictor of mortality, even when controlling 
for physician-assessed health status and health-related behaviors (Benyamini and Idler, 1999).  
This data is combined to provide new evidence on the long-run impacts of school 
desegregation.    15
IV. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Point-in-time comparisons of integrated and segregated school systems confound the 
effect of desegregation plans with the effect of factors that influenced their implementation. I 
match changes in adult attainment outcomes of blacks and whites to the exact timing of school 
desegregation. Average outcome trends in the years leading up to desegregation are compared to 
rule out competing explanations. As will be shown, the evidence is consistent with the 
identifying assumption that the timing of the initial court order is otherwise unrelated to trends in 
subsequent outcomes. Evidence of endogenous delay in implementation of major desegregation 
plan following (exogenous) initial court order supports use of 2SLS/IV approach, where the 
initial year of the court order serves as an instrument for the year of major desegregation plan 
implementation (discussed in detail below). 
Analytic data sample selection choices and estimation strategy are guided by the insights 
and considerations discussed in Section II. In particular, the aforementioned pattern of results led 
me to 1) restrict analysis to quasi-random timing of court orders that occurred b/w 1965-1990 to 
identify desegregation effects among children who grew up in districts for which I lack precise 
desegregation plan implementation information; and 2) for children from the subset of large 
districts for which I have precise desegregation plan implementation information, I use 2SLS/IV 
approach to identify effects to address endogenous delays in implementation of major 
desegregation plans (prior to 1965).  
In choosing the preferred sample for this analysis, there is a trade-off between sample 
size (using the entire sample of PSID original sample children, though not all grew up in districts 
that ever experienced court-ordered desegregation) and targeting (using the smaller sub-sample 
of children who grew up in districts that underwent court-ordered desegregation, and for which I 
have precise information of the major desegregation plan implementation year(s)). To reduce 
potential bias, in the main model specifications I limit the estimation sample to individuals who 
grew up in school districts that were subject to court-ordered desegregation at some point during 
the 1960s, 70s, or 80s, since individuals from school districts of upbringing that never 
implemented desegregation plans are arguably too different to provide a credible comparison 
group. If the sample included children from school districts that were never subject to 
desegregation court-orders, the identifying assumption would be more stringent and require that 
both when and if a district was ever under court order to be uncorrelated with trends in the   16
outcome variable. Thus, in analyses that include all PSID original sample children, models 
include school district fixed effects, along with birth cohort fixed effects interacted with an 
indicator for whether the school district of upbringing ever experienced court-ordered 
desegregation (1950-1990). 
I utilize three different, but complementary, empirical approaches to estimate the long-
run effects of school desegregation and school quality on adult attainment outcomes: (1) 
difference-in-difference and fixed effect models; (2) 2SLS/IV models; and (3) sibling fixed 
effect models. I discuss each in turn, and as will be shown, each method uncovers a parallel set 
of findings of significant, lasting impacts for blacks, with no effects for whites. 
Difference-in-Difference Approach. I estimate the impacts of court-ordered school 
desegregation, and the improvements in school quality for African Americans that accompanied 
enactment, on subsequent adult attainments. The difference-in-difference regression analysis 
attempts to isolate the component of school quality that is attributable to court-ordered 
desegregation enacted in many cities in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, when many of these 
children were growing up. The identification strategy exploits differences in childhood exposure 
during school-age years to racially-integrated schools based on variation across school districts 
and across birth cohorts in the timing of initial court orders and subsequent implementation of 
desegregation plans. I measure the proportion of an individual’s school-age years (i.e., ages 5-
17) in which they resided in a school district that was under court order to desegregate. I utilize 
the birth cohort variation in exposure to court-ordered school desegregation among the broad 
range of birth cohorts to identify effects on adult socioeconomic and health outcomes (Figure 
A7).  
Specifically, I employ a difference-in-difference framework and use variation across 
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orders (equation (2) above abstracts from this feature to ease illustration). The adult outcomes of 
interest include: educational attainment, earnings, wages, work hours, family income and poverty 
status, whether ever incarcerated, and health status. The actual models estimated use all available 
person-year observations in adulthood (for ages 20-45) of the outcomes of interest with controls 
for age, age squared and age cubed to avoid confounding life cycle and birth cohort effects. A 
spline specification is used to place some structure on the relationship between court-ordered 
desegregation exposure and adult outcomes to improve precision, but the structure imposed is 
flexible enough to allow several important specification tests to examine whether the detected 
impacts support a causal interpretation of school desegregation. 
D represents a set of dummy indicators for the three spline intervals: years before court 
orders went into effect (
*
c T b − <0); school-age years of exposure ( ) 12 0
* ≤ − ≤ c T b ; and years 
beyond school-age (
*
c T b− >12). The key parameter of interest is θ1 (relative to θ0), where  1 θ  
captures the impact of each additional year of exposure to court-ordered desegregation, ranging 
from 0 to 12 years of exposure. Let k denote the number of years before or after the initial court 
order that an individual turned 17, which is constructed from variables for year aged 17 (b) 
relative to the year of the initial desegregation order (
*
c T ) in district c. Thus, θ1k gives the 
expected difference in adult outcomes between individuals who became age 17 k years after 
initial court orders are enacted, relative to individuals who had reached age 17 the year prior to it 
(age 18 the year the court order took effect). I use the year before court orders are enacted as the 
reference point. The specification allows for the effects to manifest immediately following the 
first year of child exposure to desegregation court orders and to be a function of the duration of 
exposure, which is important both because it often took several years for a major desegregation 
plan to be fully implemented following a court order and the effects of integrated schools may 
increase with a child’s exposure to the “treatment”.
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The identification comes from variation across school districts across birth cohorts in 
court-ordered desegregation as distinct from trends due to other factors. The identifying 
assumption of the model is that, absent court-ordered school desegregation exposure during 
childhood, the black children would have experienced outcomes similar to those who grew up in 
those same communities but who had already reached age 18 prior to the desegregation court 
order, conditional on (race-specific; region-specific) year of birth effects. Or, alternatively, their   18
outcomes would have been similar to those who were born in the same year and grew up in the 
same region of the country but court-ordered desegregation in their school district of upbringing 
occurred after they had reached age 18. The specification allows a partial test of this identifying 
assumption through its test of pre-existing time trends in outcomes prior to court orders and a 
break in this trend once desegregation orders go into effect.  0 θ  captures the pre-period linear 
trend in outcomes prior to desegregation. θ2 captures the post-plan linear trend for years beyond 
school-age (i.e., this represents years of exposure during pre-school years or prior to birth). For 
example, this enables a comparison of outcomes for children who experienced desegregation 
throughout their school-age years: for one it occurred in kindergarten and for another court-
ordered desegregation occurred at 3 years old, and thus there is no difference in actual exposure 
during school-age years. This provides an important specification test in that the coefficient on θ2  
should be insignificant, if the results are consistent with a causal impact of desegregation.  
The model includes school district fixed effects ( c η ) and birth cohort fixed effects ( b λ ), 
and an extensive set of controls for childhood family and neighborhood characteristics ( icb X ). In 
a subset of specifications, I include a vector of birth cohort-by region of birth fixed effects to 
account for different trends in outcomes among individuals raised in treated districts in the South 
relative to the rest of the country. The models are estimated separately by race. (The 
county/school district fixed effects control for time-invariant community characteristics such as 
preferences for racial integration. The childhood race-region-year fixed effects control for race-
specific time trends common to children at the region-year of birth level). The standard errors are 
clustered by school district.  
I also estimate a variant of this model specification motivated by the hypothesis that for 
African-Americans, attending integrated schools during one’s elementary school years may 
result in greater benefits than exposure to integrated schools only later in the school careers due 
to two factors: 1) elementary students may have fewer social adjustments compared with older 
students who have spent more time in segregated environments; and 2) secondary schools are 
more likely to track students by academic ability (and race), which could reduce benefits of 
desegregation for minorities. Specifically, the second model specification involves the estimation 
of equation (3): 
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cb Age  represents the individual’s age when court-ordered desegregation first occurred in 
their school district of upbringing.  
The key parameters of interest include first exposure during high school (θ1), junior-
high/middle school (θ2), or elementary school yrs (θ3), relative to those who turned age 18 when 
desegregation court orders went into effect (i.e., no exposure). As in equation (2), childhood 
school-district specific trends in subsequent attainment outcomes (correlated with the timing of 
court orders) are a potential violation of the identification assumption. To assess this threat to the 
causal interpretation of the empirical estimates, this model includes an important specification 
test in that there should not exist a significant post-plan linear trend for years beyond school-age, 
if consistent with a causal impact of desegregation (i.e., θ4  should be insignificant). Furthermore, 
0 θ  provides another test of pre-existing time trends in outcomes prior to court-ordered 
desegregation. The similarity of trends in attainment outcomes in treatment and control groups in 
the period before initial court orders provides supportive evidence in favor of the identifying 
assumption. 
2SLS/IV Approach. In order to address endogenous delay in implementation of major 
desegregation plan following (exogenous) initial court order, I employ a 2SLS/IV approach, 
where the initial year of the court order serves as an instrument for the year of major 
desegregation plan implementation. I use a simplified (more parsimonious) specification for the 
second-stage of the 2SLS/IV model: 
Yicb = α + δSDPcb + Xicbβ + ηc + λb(r) + εicb  
where SDPcb  represents the number of school-age years a child was exposed to integrated 
schools brought about through the implementation of a court-ordered major desegregation plan, 
and i, c, and b indexes individuals, school districts of upbringing, and the year in which an 
individual turned 17, respectively. The identification comes from variation across school districts 
across birth cohorts in adoption of major desegregation plans induced by quasi-random timing of 
initial court orders. These models include the same set of baseline controls for child-specific and 
childhood family factors as contained in the main difference-in-difference models. The latter part 
of Section V provides more discussion of a variety of falsification exercises and specification 
tests performed.    20
Because I did not want to include endogenous residential moves (e.g., those induced by 
school quality changes that accompanied desegregation), this analysis does not attempt to 
incorporate information of family moves across school districts during the child’s school-age 
years. Instead, I identify the neighborhood and school of upbringing based on the earliest 
childhood address (in most cases, 1968).
20 The resultant potential measurement error of school 
quality will tend to lead to attenuation bias of coefficients toward zero. The analysis does capture 
school district characteristics that were changing significantly from year to year. I control for 
childhood neighborhood characteristics in the models, including neighborhood poverty rates, and 
neighborhood and housing quality indices (Appendix C). 
Using Sibling Differences to Estimate School Effects. The sibling fixed effect approach 
enables one to control for time-invariant aspects of all family and neighborhood background 
shared by siblings. The effect of school desegregation and school quality is identified by 
capitalizing on the fact that siblings of different ages may have matriculated through different 
school systems because of the rapid changes that occurred over this period of their childhoods.
21 
Within sibling pairs that attended schools with different resources, the younger sibling 
experienced integrated schools for a longer period of childhood and typically had access to 
greater school resources as reflected in greater per-pupil spending and lower class sizes during 
adolescent years. The sibling comparisons evaluate adult outcomes at the same age and controls 
for birth order, year of birth, birth weight, and whether mother was married at birth. 
The sibling difference approach complements the primary difference-in-difference 
strategy. In particular, to the extent that one is concerned that the timing of court-ordered school 
desegregation implementation is not purely exogenous across cities, school district changes not 
driven by endogenous residential mobility will clearly be exogenous within families. One 
potential parental response to the presence of city differences in the timing and scope of school 
desegregation is to move to a different city. I restrict the sample to siblings who grew up in the 
same city to eliminate this source of bias. 
That is, sibling differences in school desegregation exposure during school-age years and 
school resources during adolescence are the result of policy-induced school regime shifts 
unlikely to be endogenous, especially within families. The sibling approach assumes parents treat 
their children similarly and do not reallocate resources within the family as a result of school 
desegregation. In a subset of models across these empirical approaches, I add educational   21
attainment to the model to examine how much of the effects of school desegregation and school 
quality on adult economic and health outcomes operate through effects on educational 
attainment. 
V. RESULTS 
Educational Attainment. Table 1 contains estimates of the expanded difference-in-
difference (DiD) model specifications of the effects of court-ordered school desegregation on the 
probability of graduating from high school (columns 1-4) and years of completed schooling 
(columns 5-7), respectively. The expanded DiD specifications permit partial tests of the 
identifying assumption. For high school graduation, the baseline model presented in column (1) 
includes race-specific year of birth and region of birth fixed effects with controls for gender, 
birth weight, and childhood family/neighborhood factors; the subsequent columns sequentially 
add childhood county fixed effects and school district fixed effects along with controls for 
changes in county per-capita government transfer programs. The average high school graduation 
rates for blacks and whites for these birth cohorts is 0.73 and 0.88, respectively (here those who 
earn GEDs are classified as dropouts following Heckman & LaFontaine (2007)).  
The results indicate that each additional year of exposure to court-ordered desegregation 
leads to a 1.3 percentage-point increase in the likelihood of graduating from high school for 
blacks (coefficient on 0 to 12 years of exposure spline). These effects are large, statistically 
significant, and robust across the various model specifications. The mean and standard deviation 
change in exposure to court-ordered desegregation for the sample is roughly 5 years; thus, a 5-
year increase in exposure translates into a 6.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of 
graduating from high school for blacks. The main effects pertain to exposure to desegregation 
court orders enacted after 1964 and the discussion of results will focus on them (the interaction 
term for pre-’65 court orders suggest smaller effects for early desegregation litigation that most 
often was not accompanied by major plan implementation within a few years of the court order). 
The results across the range of adult outcomes analyzed are insensitive to whether the sample is 
restricted to those who grew up in school districts that were ever subject to court orders at some 
point between 1950-90.
22  
Similarly, large, statistically significant effects of childhood exposure to court-ordered 
desegregation on completed years of education are found for blacks. The models in columns (5)-
(7) account for regional differences in secular trends and the regional pattern of the timing of   22
initial court orders by including race-specific year of birth and region of birth fixed effects. Each 
additional year of exposure to court-ordered desegregation leads to a 0.08 increase in years of 
education for blacks. Figure 4 (top left panel) shows the implied effects translate into roughly a 
full additional year of completed education when evaluating a change from no exposure to 
exposure to court-ordered desegregation throughout one’s school-age years. Again, the results 
are robust, as the point estimates and their significance remain essentially unchanged with the 
inclusion of an extensive set of childhood controls, childhood county fixed effects, race-specific 
year of birth and region fixed effects (column 6 of Table 1), as well as school district fixed 
effects along with controls for changes in county per-capita government transfer programs 
(column 7). It is unsurprising that some of the estimated significant desegregation effects on 
blacks have wide confidence intervals in these expanded models, given the sample size and how 
saturated these models are with layers of fixed effects. The various fixed effects included still 
permit sufficient identifying variation to detect effects.    
The pre-desegregation coefficients permit a partial test of the identifying assumption that, 
in the absence of court-ordered desegregation, educational attainment would have trended 
similarly in districts which had desegregation plans implemented at different times. Credibility 
of the research design is supported by the fact that there is very little evidence of pre-existing 
trends in completed education before desegregation orders are enacted; but after enactment, we 
see a structural break in the trend for blacks. Furthermore, I find no significant effects for blacks 
for years of exposure beyond one’s school-age years across the various model specifications (as 
evidenced by the insignificant coefficient on the “>12” spline term).  
In stark contrast, for whites there are consistently no significant effects across the model 
specifications, and the point estimates are negligible. The small, insignificant effects for whites 
provide further evidence to rule out the competing hypothesis that the black improvements in 
educational attainment were driven by secular trends in desegregated districts. These results are 
highlighted in Figure A8 that displays the estimated effects of desegregation exposure for whites 
and blacks on the same graph for the probability of high school graduation and completed years 
of education, respectively.
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Table 2 presents the 2SLS/IV estimates of the effects of major desegregation plan 
implementation on the probability of high school graduation and years of education, respectively, 
by race. This set of analyses uses the year of initial court decision, intersected with a child’s   23
school-age years of exposure, as an instrument for the initial year of major desegregation 
implementation and resultant childhood exposure to major desegregation plans. The first-stage 
results are highly significant and displayed in column (1) of Table 2.
24 The models include race-
specific controls for year of birth fixed effects, gender, age at most recent survey interview, and 
childhood family/neighborhood factors. 
The results strongly reinforce the previous findings and indicate a parallel set of 
significant effects of comparable magnitudes for both high school graduation and years of 
completed education among blacks. For example, the results imply that a year of exposure to 
major desegregation plans led to a 2.9 percentage-point increase in the likelihood of graduating 
from high school and a 0.08 of a year increase in education attainment (identical point estimate 
found for blacks in Table 1). The desegregation effect sizes for blacks are comparable to the 
influence of having college-educated parents. No significant effects are found for whites.    
Men’s Labor Market Outcomes & Adult Family Income and Poverty Status 
  The next series of regression results reveal large, significant effects of court-ordered 
desegregation on blacks’ adult economic status and labor market outcomes, using the same 
sequence of model specifications. Table 3 presents desegregation effects by race on adult 
economic outcomes, including men’s annual earnings (column 1-3), wages (column 4), annual 
work hours (column 5), and family income-to-needs ratio (column 6) and poverty status among 
men and women (columns 7-9). In light of the parallel set of findings across all these long-run 
economic outcomes, the results are discussed in succession and are highlighted in Figures 4 & 
A10. All models control for the following set of child family/neighborhood background factors: 
parental income, parental education, mother's marital status at birth, birth weight, parental 
smoking and alcohol use, neighborhood poverty rate, and neighborhood and housing quality 
indices, and columns (6)-(9) control for gender; all of the economic outcome measures are in 
2000 dollars. The models include flexible controls for age (quadratic) and analyze adult 
economic outcomes for ages up to 45 to avoid conflating birth cohort and life cycle effects.
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The results indicate that an additional year of exposure to court-ordered desegregation 
significantly increases black men’s annual earnings by roughly 5 percent (column 3), which is 
the combination of a 2.9 percent significant increase in wages (column 4) and an increase in 
annual work hours of 39 hours (column 5). Furthermore, among black men and women, an 
additional year of exposure significantly increases the family income-to-needs ratio by about 0.1   24
(column 6) and reduces the annual incidence of poverty in adulthood by 1.6-1.9 percentage 
points (depending on specification, columns 7-9). As shown in columns (3) and (9), these results 
are robust to the inclusion of childhood county fixed effects, race-specific year of birth and 
region of birth fixed effects, along with controls for childhood family and neighborhood factors, 
and changes in county per-capita government transfer programs. These effects for blacks 
represent substantial improvements in adult economic status. The average effects of a 5-year 
exposure to court-ordered school desegregation (due to post-'64 orders) yields about a 25 percent 
increase in annual earnings, reflecting the combination of a 15 percent increase in wages and an 
increase in annual work hours of 195 hours. Furthermore, the results indicate that the average 
effects of a 5-year exposure to court-ordered school desegregation lead to about a 0.5 increase in 
the family income-to-needs ratio and about a 9 percentage-point decline in the annual incidence 
of poverty in adulthood for blacks.  
It is equally noteworthy that there is no evidence of pre-existing time trends for any of 
these outcomes leading up to the year in which court-orders are enacted (shown by the 
insignificant pre-desegregation coefficients on the “<0” spline term), nor is there any evidence of 
effects on blacks for years of exposure beyond one’s school-age years across the range of adult 
economic outcomes and various model specifications (shown by the insignificant coefficient on 
the “>12” spline term). Equally striking as the substantial magnitudes of the effects on blacks, is 
the consistent absence of any significant impacts on whites across all of these outcomes (Figure 
4 and Table 3). The point estimates are negligible for whites. These important specification tests 
affirm the credibility of the research design and rule out several competing explanations for the 
pattern of results. 
Table 4 presents the 2SLS/IV estimates of the effects of major desegregation plan 
implementation on men’s annual earnings (columns 1-2), wages (columns 3-4), annual work 
hours (columns 5-6), and family income-to-needs ratio (columns 7-8) and poverty status among 
men and women (columns 9-10), respectively, by race. The models include the same set of 
controls as Table 2. The results strongly reinforce the previous findings and indicate a parallel set 
of significant effects of comparable magnitudes for each of these adult labor market and 
economic status outcomes among blacks. Furthermore, among black men and women, an 
additional year of exposure to major desegregation plans significantly increases the family 
income-to-needs ratio by 0.04 (column 7) and significantly reduces the annual incidence of   25
poverty in adulthood by 2.2 percentage points (column 9). I find small, insignificant effects on 
whites across each of these economic outcomes in adulthood. The pattern of results and 
magnitudes of effects are very similar to those reported in the models in Table 3. The estimated 
magnitudes of desegregation impacts are on par with the coefficients on parental education.
26   
Probability of Incarceration 
The substantial racial disparities in incarceration, most pronounced among high school 
dropouts, have been well-documented (see e.g., Raphael (2005); Western (2007)). Increased 
investments in school quality may reduce the frequency of negative social outcomes such as 
crime (see, e.g., evidence from the Perry Pre-School Project (Schweinhart et al., 2005)). The next 
series of regression results reveal large, significant effects of court-ordered desegregation on 
black men’s annual incidence of incarceration, probability of ever being incarcerated by age 30, 
and probability of any deviant behavior (defined as ever being expelled/suspended from school, 
charged with a crime, or incarcerated), using the same sequence of model specifications. Among 
men, the proportion of blacks (whites) ever incarcerated by age 30 is 0.212 (0.080), and the 
corresponding proportion for any deviant behavior is 0.376 (0.258), for this sample of birth 
cohorts. Table 5 presents effects by race on these outcomes for men. Columns (1)-(4) display the 
linear probability model (OLS) estimates of the effects of court-ordered desegregation and 
columns (5)-(6) display the 2SLS/IV estimates of the effects of major desegregation plan 
implementation. The model specification used is a variant of those in prior models, which serve 
to highlight the larger reduction in the likelihood of incarceration among blacks who were 
exposed to integrated schools throughout their childhood years (versus those with more limited 
exposure). The models include the same set of baseline controls as previous models. 
For blacks the results indicate that, relative to growing up in segregated schools 
throughout one’s school years, exposure to desegregation beginning in one’s elementary school 
years leads to a 22.5 percentage-point reduction in the probability of deviant behavior (column 
1), a 14.7 percentage-point reduction in the probability of incarceration by age 30 (column 2), 
and a 3.8 percentage-point decline in the annual incidence of incarceration during ages 20-34 
(the peak ages of criminal involvement) (column 3). The results do not indicate any pre-existing 
trends in these outcomes prior to court-ordered desegregation, nor are there significant effects on 
blacks for years of desegregation court orders that correspond with one’s pre-school years—two 
important specification tests that support the validity of the research design. These differences   26
are less dramatic when comparisons are made for smaller increments of desegregation exposure. 
Importantly, I find no desegregation effects on the probability of incarceration for white men 
(column 4), which follows the pattern of results for educational attainment by race. 
Similarly, the 2SLS/IV estimates of the effects of exposure to major desegregation plans 
throughout one’s school-age years (relative to no exposure) imply about an 8 percentage-point 
reduction in the annual incidence of incarceration and the probability of ever being incarcerated 
by age 30 for black men (column 6), with small insignificant effects for white men. Furthermore, 
the incarceration effects explain a significant amount of the work hours’ effects of desegregation 
for black males. 
Adult Health Status 
Education has been shown to be a very strong correlate of health status in cross-sectional 
work and across generations. Scholars have long hypothesized that education has a causal effect 
on subsequent health, though the precise ways education influences adult health have not been 
well established (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006). Large gaps in morbidity and mortality 
between more- and less-educated individuals have been well documented. Furthermore, gaps in 
health between blacks and whites are large and appear to widen over the life cycle, suggestive of 
an important role of childhood conditions.  
The next series of regression results use the same sequence of model specifications, and 
reveal large, significant improvements in blacks’ adult health status resulting from exposure to 
court-ordered school desegregation. The main health outcome analyzed is self-assessed general 
health status (GHS). To scale the GHS categories, I use the health utility-based scale that was 
developed in the construction of the Health and Activity Limitation index (HALex) (details in 
Appendix C). The results are based on interval regression models using a 100-point scale where 
100 equals perfect health—the interval health values associated with GHS used are: [95, 100] for 
excellent, [85, 95) for very good, [70,85) for good, [30,70) for fair, and [1,30) for poor health.  
The general health status (GHS) index in adulthood is 6.5 points lower for blacks, on 
average, but I find substantial birth cohort differences in the magnitude of black-white health 
disparities in adulthood (evaluated at the same ages) (Johnson, 2009). In particular, while the 
age-adjusted average black-white difference in adult health status for cohorts born in the early 
1950s is 9.3 points, this difference is reduced to 4.7 and 3.3 points, among cohorts born between 
1955-1963 and 1964-1968, respectively. These cohort differences are completely driven by   27
health improvements experienced by African Americans over this period; I do not find any 
significant birth cohort differences for whites.  
The regression results (Table 6) indicate that an additional year of exposure to court-
ordered desegregation (due to post-‘64 court orders) significantly increases the adult health status 
index for blacks by between 0.3-0.6 points (columns 1-3, depending on specification). These 
results are robust to the inclusion of childhood county fixed effects, race-specific year of birth 
and region of birth fixed effects, along with controls for gender, birth weight, child health 
insurance coverage, childhood family and neighborhood factors, and changes in county per-
capita government transfer programs. The effects for blacks represent substantial improvements 
in adult health status, as the average effects of a 5-year exposure to court-ordered school 
desegregation yields about a 3 point increase in the adult health status index (column 2).  
A useful way to interpret the estimate is in relationship to the size of the effect of age on 
health, with the impact of each additional year of desegregation exposure for blacks equivalent 
(on average) to blacks reaching a level of health deterioration about 1 year later than if that year 
were spent in segregated school regimes. For example, GHS is roughly 3 points higher for black 
adults who experienced 5 years of exposure to court-ordered school desegregation (relative to 
blacks who did not), which is equal to roughly 7 years evaluated at an effect of age during one’s 
mid-30s and 40s of -0.41. This magnitude is also comparable to the impacts of parental 
education. There is little evidence of pre-existing time trends in adult health in the years leading 
up to the court order, nor are there significant effects of court orders that correspond with non-
school ages for blacks. Following the pattern of results for the education and adult 
socioeconomic attainment outcomes, I again find negligible desegregation effects on the adult 
health status of whites. Similarly, the 2SLS/IV estimates imply that the effects of 5 years of 
exposure to major desegregation plans result in about a 2.6 point increase in the adult health 
index for blacks (column 4), with insignificant desegregation effects found for whites (column 
5). 
The results across the main set of adult attainment outcomes analyzed using the expanded 
difference-in-difference model specifications are summarized in Figure 4. The primary 
identification strategy hinges on the assumption that there are no underlying trends in the average 
school quality inputs and subsequent attainment outcomes of school districts that are correlated 
with the timing of the initial court order. This assumption was evaluated directly in event study   28
analyses. These strongly support the exogeneity of the initial court order. First, the pre-period 
trend is flat, showing no systematic differences in school district trends prior to initial court 
order. Second, school quality inputs increased sharply during the first several years after court-
ordered desegregation was first enacted (relative to the levels of segregation, per-pupil spending, 
class size, respectively, that prevailed one year prior to the court order). The long-run impacts 
exhibit a similar pattern: 1) no systematic evidence of pre-existing time trends in the years before 
these court orders are enacted; and 2) subsequent adult attainment outcomes improve 
significantly with duration of exposure to desegregation up to school-age years and not thereafter 
for blacks, with no effects found for whites. This provides strong evidence for the validity of the 
identification strategy, as any confounding factor would have to very closely mimic the timing of 
the initial court order (and subsequent implementation) to result in a pattern like this. The small, 
insignificant effects for whites provides further evidence to rule out the competing hypothesis 
that blacks’ improvements in outcomes were driven by secular trends in outcomes in 
desegregated districts.
27   
Table 7 presents sibling fixed effect models designed to assess the long-run effects of 
school desegregation on education and adult health. I find that black children who were exposed 
to court-ordered school desegregation for the majority of their school-age years experienced 
significantly improved education and health outcomes in adulthood, compared with their older 
siblings who grew up in segregated school environments with weaker school resources 
(controlling for age and birth cohort effects). Negligible effects are found for whites.  I find that 
education and health outcomes among blacks were particularly affected by changes in access to 
school resources associated with desegregation, not simply changes in exposure to white 
students.  
The sibling fixed effect results reveal that individuals who attended schools during their 
adolescent years with higher per-pupil spending, as compared with levels that prevailed when 
their siblings were adolescents, experienced better education and health outcomes in adulthood 
(evaluated at the same age) (columns (3),(6) of Table 7). The identification of these effects is 
driven largely by significant per-pupil spending increases in a relatively short period of the 1970s 
in many areas. I find little evidence that observable differences among siblings are related to 
differences in the quality of high schools they attend. There is no evidence that the results are 
biased by a positive correlation between sibling differences in school inputs and sibling   29
differences in other factors that are favorable to adult health status. I find similar patterns using 
sibling fixed effect models for socioeconomic attainment outcomes.
28       
Robustness & Falsification Tests 
The baseline specification was chosen to minimize potential bias. We have already 
witnessed the results to be robust to alternative functional form, specification tests, and 
alternative empirical strategies (with different underlying identification assumptions). For 
example, adding controls for dimensions of school quality in a school district of upbringing in 
years the individual was not in school (pre-school ages or beyond age 17) does not significantly 
alter the results. The estimated effects on adult outcomes of per-pupil spending in years in which 
the individual was not in K-12 schooling are very close to zero, and the effects of experienced 
per-pupil spending remains significant and essentially unchanged. This is expected if 
endogeneity issues do not drive the results. This finding confirms that the results do not simply 
reflect community-level differences in attitudes about the importance of education that are 
correlated with determinants of adult attainments. The lack of significant effects of court-ordered 
school desegregation in periods that correspond with years beyond school-ages also eliminates 
the concern that there is a monotonic relationship between subsequent (age-adjusted) attainment 
outcomes and the timing of the initial court order that (instead) reflect secular trends in outcomes 
that would have prevailed in the absence of school desegregation.  
As an additional way of evaluating the validity of the identifying assumption of the 
model, I tested whether exposure to court-ordered desegregation is uncorrelated with changes in 
child county per-capita transfer payments from income-support programs that might influence 
outcomes under consideration, conditional on the controls already in specification (1) above. If 
the identifying assumption of the model holds, then we might expect the estimates to change 
very little with the addition of these characteristics. As witnessed in the results presented, these 
additional controls have very little impact on the coefficients of interest, which is not surprising 
given that significant relationships between these government transfer programs and 
desegregation exposure arise about as often as would be expected through pure chance. The 
broad set of childhood family/neighborhood controls have the expected signs and significantly 
improve the precision of the coefficients of interest. 
Table A2 probes the robustness of these estimates further. As an additional falsification 
exercise, I re-estimated equation (2) replacing the timing of initial court ordered desegregation   30
variables with litigation cases that were not successful and the corresponding year of their court 
ruling to identify effects; in essence estimating the effects of a series of “placebo” initiatives. If 
my baseline estimates capture the effects of school desegregation – not an earlier or later 
unobserved shock or intervention – the largest estimates of desegregation effects should arise 
from estimation of the model as originally specified. Indeed, this is the case (Table A2). In 
particular, a placebo treatment variable is included in the model which captures the years of 
childhood exposure to unsuccessful court litigation. The coefficient on the placebo variable 
should be small and insignificant. Indeed, when I used the placebo and the corresponding year of 
their court ruling to identify effects, they are not associated with any measurable impact on any 
outcome of interest. These results demonstrate that timing of unsuccessful court litigation is 
unrelated to adult attainment outcomes; only the timing of initial year of successful litigation that 
led to court-ordered school desegregation is significantly associated with blacks’ adult 
socioeconomic & health attainments. This provides additional evidence that the main results are 
not spurious, and helps rule out confounding influences from changing local demographic 
characteristics or social policies. If such omitted variables spuriously inflate the estimated effect 
of desegregation, the placebo coefficient should be significant. It is not. 
These falsification tests provide additional evidence that unobserved factors do not 
contaminate the estimates. The results are robust to many other sensitivity tests including adding 
more fixed effects, examining subgroups of the sample, and placebo tests on groups not likely to 
be affected (e.g., contemporaneous black adult employment rates (in occupations outside of K-12 
education), providing further evidence of the exogeneity of the treatment. The results, as 
expected, show no significant impact of desegregation plan exposure for any of these groups—
the point estimates are small, mostly statistically insignificant, and negative compared to the 
consistently positive and significant estimates for blacks. 
The evidence collectively is not consistent with alternative omitted-variables counter-
explanations of results (i.e., other factors that happen to be changing at the same time these 
desegregation orders are implemented). Based on the robustness of the results, such an 
alternative explanation would have to be a cause that meets the following very strict criteria: a) it 
closely follow the timing of desegregation (given the evidence showing no pre-existing time 
trends); b)  yet it be geographically confined to the specific school districts that were undergoing 
desegregation implementation (given the robustness of the results to the inclusion of race-  31
specific year of birth and region of birth fixed effects); c) its impacts are constrained only to 
school-age years of exposure (given the evidence showing no effects for non-school age years, 
whether pre-school ages or beyond age 17); d) had the largest impacts on blacks in communities 
where desegregation resulted in the largest changes in school quality inputs (Table 8); and finally 
e) had no effects on whites. The results support a causal interpretation of the effects of school 
desegregation by uncovering sharp differences in the estimated long-run effects on cohorts born 
within a fairly narrow window of each other that differ in whether and how long they actually 
attended desegregated schools. 
Exploring the Mechanisms. The analysis cannot cleanly identify the mechanism through 
which school desegregation influenced long-run adult outcomes, but one potential pathway that 
merits careful consideration is through impacts of school quality improvements (i.e., greater 
school resources for blacks in integrated schools) on the socioeconomic mobility process. The 
amount of desegregation achieved by the courts varied from district to district, as did the 
resultant change in access to school quality inputs received by minority children. This was in part 
because desegregation was achieved in a variety of ways across school districts and was applied 
in many different initial school environments based on the form of racial segregation—de jure in 
the South and de facto in other regions of the country. I augment the primary model 
specifications to investigate whether impacts appear to differ by the scope of desegregation (as 
proxied by the estimated (residual) change in per-pupil spending (school segregation) implied by 
the models estimated in Section II that are net of region-specific trends and time-invariant school 
district characteristics). For each district, I compute the change in school district per-pupil 
spending induced by the court-order from the year preceding enactment to the first several years 
following implementation. I then exploit variation in the scope of desegregation court orders in 
addition to quasi-random variation in the timing to assess whether there is evidence of a dose-
response effect of school quality improvements on subsequent education, economic, and health 
attainment outcomes among blacks.  
The results are presented in Table 8. The sample for this subset of analyses is restricted to 
PSID original sample black children who grew up in school districts that were initially subject to 
court order after 1963, for which I have school district per-pupil spending (school segregation) 
information 1 year before and 3 years after initial court order. The estimated district-specific 
induced-change in per-pupil spending (school segregation) is net of school district fixed effects   32
and region-specific time trends; these changes are centered around the respective average change 
($1,000 for per-pupil spending; 0.15 for black-white exposure index) in the model, so that the 
main effects capture the average desegregation impact. 
For blacks’ educational, economic and health attainments, the results suggest that 
changes in school quality resulting from integration played an important role. The results 
indicate significant interactive effects of school desegregation exposure with the resultant change 
in access to school quality, as proxied by changes in per-pupil spending. I find that court-ordered 
desegregation that led to larger improvements in school quality resulted in more beneficial 
educational, economic, and health outcomes in adulthood for blacks who grew up in those court-
ordered desegregation districts. To facilitate interpretation of marginal effects, the units of the 
per-pupil spending are in thousands of dollars—a 1-unit change represents a $1,000 change in 
spending (2000 dollars). Thus, each additional year of exposure to school desegregation that 
resulted in an additional $1,000 increase in per-pupil spending led to educational attainment 
among blacks that was about 0.08 of a year higher than the average improvement in years of 
education among blacks induced by school desegregation. This effect translates into roughly a 
0.9 of a year increase in educational attainment when evaluating a change from no exposure to 
exposure to court-ordered desegregation throughout one’s school-age years. Shown in column 
(3), these effects persist after the inclusion of corresponding increases in the black-white 
exposure index that accompanied desegregation. On the other hand, there is suggestive evidence 
that reductions in school segregation levels that were not accompanied by significant changes in 
school resources did not have appreciable long-run impacts on blacks’ adult attainments. 
Conversely, the results indicate that exposure to school desegregation throughout one’s school-
age years that resulted in an additional $1,000 increase in per-pupil spending led to a family 
income-to-needs ratio that was about 0.6 higher, an annual poverty incidence in adulthood that 
was 6.8 percentage points lower, and an adult health status index that was about 4.5 points higher 
among blacks than the average effect induced by school desegregation.  
The difference-in-difference, 2SLS/IV, and sibling-difference estimates indicate that 
school desegregation and accompanied increases in school quality resulted in significant 
improvements in adult socioeconomic and health outcomes for African-Americans. The pattern 
of results is remarkably similar across all of the empirical approaches. I estimate the extent to 
which the black-white gap in completed education, and adult economic and health status   33
narrowed as a result of childhood exposure to school desegregation (i.e., I compare the black-
white gap in the child cohorts that experienced school desegregation plans relative to the black-
white gap in cohorts just prior to school desegregation), and  the results imply a leading 
contributing role of school desegregation in narrowing the gaps in socioeconomic and adult 
health outcomes witnessed for these birth cohorts. The increase in subsequent adult economic 
and health status among African Americans for successive cohorts born between 1950 and 1975 
mirrored the improvements in access to school quality that accompanied school desegregation 
during their school-age years. African-Americans who attended integrated schools during their 
elementary school years appear to benefit more than those exposed to integrated schools only 
later in their school careers. Black children’s subsequent adult outcomes improved most among 
those who were from districts that experienced the largest changes in school quality inputs 
following desegregation. Both patterns are consistent with a treatment dose-response 
relationship. 
The most obvious channel through which these child school-related impacts manifest is 
through their effects on educational attainment and adult earnings, which in turn influence adult 
health. To provide some suggestive evidence of the importance of this pathway, I examine to 
what extent the estimated effects of school desegregation on subsequent adult outcomes are 
reduced once measures of educational attainment are included. The results strongly suggest that 
the increases in the quantity and quality of educational attainment among blacks that resulted 
from desegregation played a central role in the subsequent improvements in adult economic 
status and health status experienced for these cohorts. I find that a significant part of the impacts 
was the result of a combination of increases in the levels of educational attainment and in the 
returns to education. There is also some evidence that measures of school quality inputs steepen 
the education slope (not shown).    
I hypothesize that the effects likely depend on desegregation program type and student 
characteristics. Various unreported specifications assessed whether the reduced-form effect of 
court-ordered desegregation plans on subsequent attainment outcomes differ by region, size of 
total enrollment, proportion minority, segregation levels prior to litigation, desegregation plan 
type, and several other school district characteristics. There is no evidence that the effects vary 
by these characteristics. I find that the estimated effects of desegregation court orders on adult 
economic and health status are similar for the subset of black children who grew up in the South   34
and those who grew up in other regions of the country. The lack of heterogeneity in effects 
between southern and non-southern school districts is particularly noteworthy. 
VI. SUMMARY DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Differences across districts in when desegregation court cases were first filed and the 
length of time it took these cases to proceed through the judicial system are used as a plausibly 
exogenous source of identifying variation to analyze the long-run impacts of school 
desegregation. The exogeneity of the timing of initial court orders is supported theoretically by 
the documented legal history of school desegregation and by my own empirical examination of 
the issue. The analysis capitalizes on this source of identifying variation.  
I control for possible confounders in a number of ways. First, I examine the determinants 
of the timing of the occurrence of the initial court order and major desegregation plan adoption, 
and find that collectively the pre-treatment school quality, SES, demographic, and labor market 
related characteristics do not significantly predict the year of the initial court order. Second, I 
estimate event study models that further support the validity of the research design. Third, I 
perform a variety of robustness checks to test the validity of the identifying assumptions.  
The findings of this study contribute to the literature in several important ways. First, this 
study is the most comprehensive to date on the topic, especially in terms of the range of 
empirical approaches utilized, broad set of outcomes analyzed, and the long time horizon 
considered. Second, this paper provides important, new estimates of the impact of court-ordered 
school desegregation.  
I use an event study framework and exploit the wide quasi-random variation in the timing 
and scope of implementation of desegregation plans during the 1960s, 70s and 80s to identify 
these effects. I find that school desegregation significantly increased educational attainment 
among blacks exposed to major desegregation plans during their school-age years, with impacts 
found on completed years of schooling, the likelihood of graduating from high school, attending 
college, and graduating with a 4-year college degree. The analysis disentangles the effects of 
neighborhood attributes and school quality.  
Difference-in-differences estimates and sibling-difference estimates indicate that school 
desegregation and the accompanied increases in school quality also resulted in significant 
improvements in adult labor market outcomes and reductions in adult poverty incidence for 
blacks. This research highlights the important role that school quality plays in influencing the   35
risk of dropping out of high school, incarceration, the likelihood of graduating from college, and 
adult earnings, which in turn affect later-life health. The significant long-run impacts of school 
desegregation found for blacks with parallel findings across a broad set of socioeconomic 
outcomes and health status indicators of well-being, with no corresponding impacts found for 
whites, is striking.  
The results suggest that the mechanisms through which school desegregation led to 
beneficial socioeconomic outcomes in adulthood for blacks include improvement in access to 
school resources, which is reflected in reductions in class size and increases in per-pupil 
spending. Furthermore, the evidence is consistent with a dose-response effect of school quality 
improvements and the duration of exposure to them on subsequent attainments in adulthood. The 
magnitude of the estimated effects of dimensions of school quality are larger than estimates 
reported in previous research and, taken together, are larger than the impact of increasing 
parents’ income by a comparable amount.  
Putting the magnitudes in perspective in relation to previous studies. 
A large body of literature examines the effects of school spending on academic 
performance and educational attainment (Hanushek, 1997; Hedges, Greenwald, and Laine, 
1994). Evidence is mixed on the extent to which school resources matter. An important 
limitation of most recent studies that find insignificant results focusing on the effects of school 
quality on labor market outcomes using longitudinal individual-level data is that earnings are 
observed at young ages (averaging around 23 years old). Based on these factors, Card and 
Krueger (1996) conclude, “Our review of the literature reveals a high degree of consistency 
across studies regarding the effects of school quality on student’s subsequent earnings. The 
literature suggests that a 10 percent increase in school spending is associated with a 1 to 2 
percent increase in annual earnings for students later in their lives” (p. 133).  
Inadequate controls for childhood family and neighborhood characteristics can lead to 
omitted variable bias of estimated school effects. In their summary of the school literature, Card 
and Krueger echo this concern. A strength of the analyses contained in this paper, in addition to 
its credible research design, is both the extensive set of controls for childhood family and 
neighborhood characteristics and the ability to follow adult attainment outcomes into one’s peak 
earnings years through age 45.   36
The study most directly related to the approach taken in this paper is Guryan (2004), who 
uses variation in the timing of desegregation plan implementation in the 1970s and 1980s to 
identify the effects of school segregation on black high school dropout rates for a subset of large 
school districts (Welch/Light data). Using data from the 1970 and 1980 censuses, he uses 
difference-in-difference and fixed effect methods and finds that desegregation explains ½ of the 
decline in the black high school dropout rate during the 1970s among the 125 large school 
districts he analyzed. Guryan (2004) reports IV estimates that are two to four times larger in 
magnitude than OLS estimates. This pattern is consistent with the findings of this study. One 
explanation for the larger estimated effects in this paper than ones based directly on models of 
the effects of desegregation plans is that the timing of initial court orders is more plausibly 
exogenous than the year of first implementation of major desegregation plans, due to endogenous 
delays in effective implementation. There were longer delays in implementation of major 
desegregation plans following initial court orders for districts that had significant minority 
proportion, larger per-capita school spending, teacher salary, smaller average student-to-teacher 
ratios, and/or greater income (Table A1). These factors likely lead OLS estimates of the effects 
of desegregation plans to be understated. 
Experimental evidence from the Tennessee Project Star class size intervention 
demonstrates that black students benefited about twice as much as whites from being assigned to 
a small class (0.24 vs. 0.12 standard deviations on math and reading student test scores for each 
grade). Krueger and Whitmore (2002) find that this result is largely driven by a larger treatment 
effect for all students regardless of race in predominantly black schools, suggesting that benefits 
from additional resources are higher in such schools.  
The findings of the present study show that labor market outcomes, and adult income and 
health status rose in line with blacks’ educational improvements, as did declines in the incidence 
of incarceration, with private rates of return as high as 30 percent for those who experienced 
integrated schools throughout childhood (relative to those who grew up in segregated schools). 
Table 9 presents a summary of the implied Wald estimates of the returns to education (reflecting 
a combination of both increased quantity and quality) across the adult outcomes. A Wald 
estimate of the returns to education on wages is the ratio of the estimates of the desegregation 
effects on wages and completed years of education, yielding a return of 27 percent 
(0.0219/0.0800). These estimates are notably larger than the 8 to 14 percent returns typically   37
estimated using modern era schooling interventions and data sources from more recent (younger) 
birth cohorts (e.g., Card, 1999). If a Wald estimate is constructed based on effects on the 
incidence of adult poverty, probability of incarceration, and adult health status, the implied 
returns to education are even larger. The incarceration effects of desegregation are consistent 
with Lochner and Moretti (2004), who report that a 10 percentage-point increase in high school 
graduation rates would reduce overall violent crime arrest rates for blacks by 25 percent and 
reduce murder arrests by two-thirds.  
There are several plausible explanations for the much larger estimates obtained in these 
analyses. First, improved school environments could have facilitated a higher quality teacher 
workforce and thus boosted the return to a year of school. A second possibility is that the returns 
to schooling for those who were most impacted by school desegregation plans were just 
extremely large. Thirdly, the marginal returns to education for the groups affected by school 
desegregation may be larger than the average return. Card (1999) shows that heterogeneous rates 
of return to education may arise due to differing costs of education, preferences, or marginal 
returns to the production function relating schooling to earnings. Card suggests that one possible 
explanation for the tendency for many IV estimates of the returns to schooling to exceed OLS 
estimates is that in the presence of heterogeneous returns, the marginal returns to education for 
the groups affected by the instrument may be larger than the average return.
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Finally, the data and methods improve upon prior research, which lacked access to panel 
data that follow children from birth to adulthood, relied on aggregate state-level analyses, and/or 
failed to address the endogeneity of residential location. This paper is among the first to provide 
evidence to assess the extent and ways in which childhood school quality factors causally 
influence later-life health outcomes. The evidence collectively paints a consistent picture of 
significant later-life health returns of school quality. The results highlight the significant impacts 
of educational attainment on future health status, and point to the importance of school quality in 
influencing socioeconomic mobility prospects, which in turn have far-reaching impacts on 
health. The results demonstrate that racial convergence in school quality and educational 
attainment following court-ordered school desegregation played a significant role in accounting 
for the reduction in the black-white adult health gap. While no single explanation likely accounts 
for this rapid convergence, this work shows that school desegregation was a primary contributor, 
explaining a sizable share of the narrowing of the racial education, and economic and health   38
status gaps among the cohorts examined. Small, statistically insignificant results across each of 
these adult outcomes for whites suggest that benefits for minority children do not come at the 
expense of white students.  
A limitation of the court-order desegregation results is their reduced-form nature. I 
cannot separately identify the pathways through which desegregation impacts subsequent adult 
attainments. It may not be the school desegregation so much as the nature and type of school 
desegregation implementation (e.g., how much it changed access to school resources for 
minority children) that matter most for long-run economic well-being and thereby adult health. 
Future research should further uncover the precise structure of the underlying causal linkages 
between school desegregation and subsequent attainment. Separately identifying and 
disentangling the mechanisms underlying the overall causal impact of desegregation is very 
difficult with available data and is left for future work.    
Racial inequality in school quality varied significantly across school districts, differed by 
school characteristics, and narrowed over this period. The quality of black children’s education 
improved in quantity and quality in both absolute and relative terms. This study illustrates the 
gains in human capital acquisition among blacks that occurred due to greater accessibility of 
dimensions of school quality. The findings highlight the large productivity gains that can arise 
when substantial improvement to school inputs are introduced to equalize differences in access 
to school quality. It is important to bear in mind that these gains may have occurred against the 
backdrop of countervailing influences, such as the rise in single-parent families, concentrated 
poverty, deterioration of neighborhood conditions for low-income families with the exodus of 
the middle class to the suburbs, and sentencing policy reforms during the mid-1980s and 90s that 
sky-rocketed incarceration rates among African-Americans. This may account for the increasing 
heterogeneity in outcomes witnessed among blacks in successive cohorts since this period.   
Brown offered the hope and promise of better educational opportunities for minority 
children in the US, and was intended not only to promote equitable access to school quality but 
to alter the attitudes and socialization of children -- beginning at the youngest ages. A motivation 
of this study was to attempt to quantify the extent to which progress was made in fulfillment of 
policy expectations and to evaluate the enduring impact of what is arguably the most important 
subcomponent of legal actions during the Civil Rights era. This work contributes to a growing 
literature that evaluates the longer-run effects of the Civil Rights Act, Great Society, and War on   39
Poverty policy initiatives.
30 The present research is the first to contribute estimates of the effects 
of school desegregation (and school quality) on adult economic and health outcomes using a 
plausibly exogenous source of identifying variation. This study highlights the importance of 
analyses on the returns to education policies beyond labor market outcomes. The findings of this 
paper strongly suggest that estimates of the returns to education that focus on increases in wages 
substantially understate the total returns. Given the scarcity of large-scale educational 
experiments that had such dramatic changes in access to school quality, it is important to learn as 
much as possible about the long-run consequences of one of the great social experiments of 
inclusion.    
                                                 
1 The PSID oversampled low-income families and blacks, which enables sufficient sample sizes to analyze race 
differences in adult attainments. Probability sample weights are used to produce nationally-representative estimates. 
2 This desegregation case data was compiled by legal scholars for The American Communities Project at Brown 
University, and I combine it with additional information from Welch and Light (1987) on the dates of major 
desegregation plan implementation for large urban districts. 
3 Integration may also influence long-term outcomes in ways that are unrelated to educational outcomes. 
4 A more complete explanation of sources for the desegregation case data and its construction is contained in 
Appendix A. 
5 I augment this data with the dataset compiled by Welch and Light (1987) for the US Commission on Civil Rights, 
which covers all districts that in 1968 were 20 to 90 percent minority with enrollments of 50,000 or more, and a 
random sample of districts that were 10-90 percent minority with enrollments of between 15,000-50,000. In 1968 
these districts accounted for 45 percent of minority enrollment in the US. 
6 The models estimated upon which Figures 1-3 are based also include dummy indicators for the corresponding 
years in excess of 6 before and after court-ordered desegregation, respectively; these are not displayed in the figures 
because of the lack of precision due to limited observations that far away from the year of initial court order (plan 
implementation). 
7 Note, however, that the point estimates corresponding to y < -3 and y>3 are estimated from a smaller sample of 
school districts than estimates for the intervening years. This is because school district-level data on per-pupil 
spending and teacher-to-student ratios is not available annually for many districts before 1968. As a robustness 
check for court-order induced effects on dimensions of school quality, I used a balanced panel of school districts that 
includes districts only if they contribute to the identification of the entire vector of leads and lags of implementation 
impacts (i.e., districts that have school quality information in at least three years before and three years after 
implementation). Evidence shows that the increase in the treatment effect in the first 4 years after the court order is 
not a spurious result of the differing set of districts identifying the parameters. 
8 This part of the research design is similar in setup to a recent study by Reber (2007) on the impacts of court-
ordered school desegregation on indices of racial school segregation. 
9 For example, this period included the desegregation of hospitals (and workplaces), and the introduction of 
Medicaid, Medicare, Head Start, and the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC). 
Further, AFDC, Social Security, and disability income programs expanded. 
10 I am grateful to Doug Almond, Hilary Hoynes, and Diane Schanzenbach for sharing the Regional Economic 
Information System (REIS) data for the 1959 to 1978 period. 
11 The dissimilarity index declines by nearly 0.25 points and the black-white exposure index increases by 0.15 
within 1-2 years following major plan implementation (shown in the upper- and lower-right graphs of Figure 1). 
Levels of racial integration in schools peaked around 1988. 
12 Among the set of school districts that underwent court-ordered school desegregation at some time between 1954 
and 1980, the 25
th and 75
th percentile of the school district proportion of students who were black was 0.2 and 0.4, 
respectively, in 1970.    40
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Taken together, the results presented for all school districts that implemented school desegregation plans over this 
period are consistent with evidence Reber (2007) found for Louisiana. Namely, she found that in Louisiana, between 
1965 and 1970, when court orders were enacted, they were accompanied by large increases in school funding 
resources for black students, where the infusion of state funds was used to “level-up” school spending in integrated 
schools to the level previously experienced only in the white schools. 
14 The analytic sample includes 14,869 schools from 667 districts from 33 different states; standard errors clustered 
at school-level. 
15 Among districts that took major steps to desegregate, the implementation of desegregation was followed by 
substantial positive changes in reported community-wide attitudes toward school desegregation in a majority of 
school districts. Serious disruptions to education process were reported in less than 20 percent of districts that 
underwent desegregation implementation between 1966-75 (Office of Civil Rights Report, 1977). 
16 The PSID began interviewing a national probability sample of families in 1968. These families were re-
interviewed each year through 1997, when interviewing became biennial. All persons in PSID families in 1968 have 
the PSID “gene,” which means that they are followed in subsequent waves. When children with the “gene” become 
adults and leave their parents’ homes, they become their own PSID “family unit” and are interviewed in each wave.  
Moreover, the genealogical design implies that the PSID sample today includes numerous adult sibling groupings 
who have been members of PSID-interviewed families for nearly four decades. 
17 The PSID maintains extremely high wave-to-wave response rates of 95-98%. Appendix C discusses the extent to 
which sample selection, including mortality, may bias the reported estimates. Studies have concluded that the PSID 
sample of heads and wives remains representative of the national sample of adults (Gottschalk et al, 1999). 
18 For a significant share of the individuals in our sample who were children in 1968, 1984 represents roughly the 
year in which they became heads of households as adults. Due to the complexity of the health status changes for 
women during the childbearing years, I exclude self-assessed health status measures of women in the years they 
were pregnant. 
19 It is also possible that outcomes may have been influenced by the announcement of impending desegregation 
(e.g., “white flight” in response to the announcement by the Federal court that desegregation would begin at the start 
of the next school year). 
20 Among original sample children in the PSID, the average proportion of childhood spent growing up in the 1968 
neighborhood was roughly two-thirds. 
21 This use of sibling models follows the research design previously utilized by Altonji and Dunn (1996) to analyze 
the effects of school quality on wages. 
22 When the full sample is used, models include a dummy indicator for whether the child’s school district was ever 
subject to court order interacted with year of birth fixed effects.  
23 In Appendix C, I also present results from multinomial models of educational attainment, which examine whether 
the effect of school desegregation and the associated effects that duration of exposure had on blacks were limited to 
those on the margin of dropping out of high school, or whether such effects also led to increased college attendance 
and completion rates. 
24 The sample includes original sample PSID children born between 1951-70 who grew up in large school districts 
that implemented major desegregation plans sometime during the 1960s or 70s (Welch/Light desegregation data). 
25 Columns (1)-(4) simplify the exposure specification by not including pre-'65 court order interaction terms because 
of the smaller male-only sample for labor market outcomes; similar patterns of results when interactions are 
included. The interaction terms of pre-'65 court orders with the other spline segments (columns (5)-(9)) are 
suppressed to conserve space. 
26 The sum of coefficients of mother’s and father’s education on adult wages is roughly 0.04. 
27 Additionally, Weiner et al. (2010) report no systematic relationship between the timing of these court orders and 
either the level or change in political composition of local federal courts. 
28 These additional results are suppressed to conserve space; available upon request. 
29 This could arise if marginal returns are higher for those with low levels of schooling and the instrument (e.g., 
school reforms, school accessibility) mainly affects this segment of the population by lowering the costs of 
schooling. It seems plausible that desegregation disproportionately benefited those students with high costs of 
schooling and with especially high marginal rates of return. 
30 Recent examples include Chay, Guryan, and Mazumder (2009) (desegregation of hospitals and academic 
achievement), Almond, Chay and Greenstone (Civil rights and infant mortality), Finkelstein & McKnight (Medicare 
introduction), Cascio, Gordon, Lewis and Reber (Title I), Ludwig and Miller (Head Start), Almond, Hoynes and 
Schanzenbach (food stamps and birth outcomes), and McCrary (court-ordered police hiring quotas). BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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The Effect of Desegregation Plans on the
Black-White Exposure Index
School Desegregation Effects on Racial School Segregation
School Data: Office of Civil Rights,1968-82. Includes all districts under court order sometime b/w 1954-80 (N=655, American Communities Project data; N=99, Welch/Light data). 
Results based on regression w/school district FE, region*year FE, and controls for changes in gov't transfer programs. Avg black-white dissimilarity (exposure) index in '68 among 
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Effects of Court-Ordered Desegregation on
Per-pupil Spending From State Revenue Source:
By Proportion of District that is Black
Effects of Court-Ordered Desegregation
on Per-Pupil School Spending
School District Data: Census of Governments,1962-92. Balanced panel of all school districts under court order sometime b/w 1954-80, for which there is at least one measure 
before and after court order (N=564). Results based on regression model with school district FE, year FE, & controls for changes in gov't transfer programs; results robust to 









































-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Years Since Initial Court Order
95%CI-U, State Aid 95%CI-L, State Aid
State Aid Fed Aid
Local
The Effect of Court-Ordered











































-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Years Since Initial Court Order
95%CI-U, Large %Black 95%CI-U, Small %Black
Per-pupil Spending from State
Large % District Black(>.35)
Per-pupil Spending from State
Small % District Black(<.2)
95%CI-L, Large %Black 95%CI-L, Small %Black
Effects of Court-Ordered Desegregation on
Per-pupil Spending From State Revenue Source:
By Proportion of District that is Black
Effects of Court-Ordered Desegregation

































-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Years since Initial Court Order
95% CI-U 95% CI-L
Predicted
The Effect of Court-Ordered Desegregation on the

































-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Years since Plan Implementation
95% CI-U 95% CI-L
Predicted
The Effect of Desegregation Plans on the










The Effect of Court-Ordered Desegregation on










The Effect of Court-Ordered Desegregation on the
Average Class Size for Blacks
The Effect of School Desegregation on
Average Class Size by Race
School Data: Census of Governments & Office of Civil Rights, 1962-77. Includes all districts under court order sometime b/w 1954-80 (N=667, American Communities Project data; 
N=99, Welch/Light data). Results based on regression w/school district FE, region-specific linear time trends, and controls for changes in gov't transfer programs.  Models are 
weighted by baseline black student enrollment so that results can be interpreted as desegregation effect experienced by the average black child. Similarly, result in lower left graph for 
whites is weighted by baseline white student enrollment so results can be interpreted as desegregation effect experienced by the average white child; no significant effects are found for 
whites.  The lower right graph uses school-level data for subset of years in which this information is available and models are weighted by black student enrollment at the school-level 
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The Effect of School Desegregation on
Average Class Size by RaceExposure to Court-Ordered Desegregation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Main Effects apply to non-Hispanic Blacks                                    
for post-'64 court orders) 
(Year aged 17 - Year of Initial Court Order), spline:
     <0 (no exposure, linear trend prior to court order) -0.0115* 0.0011 -0.0040 -0.0026 -0.0371 -0.0618 -0.0351
(0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0087) (0.0092) (0.0286) (0.0452) (0.0483)
    (0 to 12) 0.0137** 0.0141** 0.0114* 0.0104+ 0.0800*** 0.0811*** 0.0788***
(0.0056) (0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0282) (0.0261) (0.0272)
    (0 to 12)*#of yrs before '65 for pre-'65 court orders -0.0022** -0.0024** -0.0033 0.0024 -0.0061+ -0.0066 0.0251
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0139) (0.0265)
    >12 (beyond school-age years of exposure) -0.0024 0.0014 0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0428 -0.0306 -0.1206*
(0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0151) (0.0166) (0.0705) (0.0570) (0.0690)
     <0*White 0.0161** -0.0008 0.0110 0.0103 0.0001 0.0612 0.0512
(0.0073) (0.0085) (0.0091) (0.0097) (0.0451) (0.0515) (0.0507)
    (0 to 12)*White -0.0122** -0.0102+ -0.0106+ -0.0102+ -0.0449 -0.0823*** -0.0924***
(0.0059) (0.0076) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0426) (0.0293) (0.0301)
    (0 to 12)*(#of yrs before '65 for pre-'65 court orders)*White 0.0012 0.0011 0.0010 0.0008 -0.0032 0.0020 0.0069
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0073)
     >12*White 0.0050 0.0063 -0.0014 -0.0050 0.0415 -0.0007 0.0362
(0.0191) (0.0196) (0.0186) (0.0196) (0.1040) (0.0832) (0.0885)
Total Effect for Whites, spline:
     <0 0.0046 0.0003 0.0070 0.0077 -0.0370 -0.0006 0.0161
    (0 to 12) 0.0015 0.0039 0.0008 0.0002 0.0351 -0.0012 -0.0136
    (0 to 12)*#of yrs before '65 for pre-'65 court orders -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0023 0.0032 -0.0093 -0.0046 0.0320
     >12 0.0026 0.0077 0.0000 -0.0056 -0.0013 -0.0313 -0.0844
Full sample w/ever court order indicator*year of birth FE? yes -- yes yes -- yes yes
Subsample who grew up in districts ever under court order? no yes no no yes no no
Region of birth & Race-specific year of birth fixed effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Race-specific region of birth fixed effects? yes no yes yes no yes yes
Childhood county fixed effects? no yes yes -- no yes --
Childhood school district fixed effects? no no no yes no no yes
Controls for Δchild county per-capita govt transfer programs? no no no no no no yes
Number of individuals 5,436 2,958 5,436 5,436 3,582 6,307 6,307
Number of childhood families 2,068 1,083 2,068 2,068 1,182 2,216 2,216
Number of childhood neighborhoods 1,477 824 1,477 1,477 891 1,562 1,562
Number of school districts 332 142 332 332 143 337 337
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at school district level; clustered at neighborhood level if school district FE are included)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (2-tailed test), + p<0.10 (one-tailed test)
Table 1.  Effects of Court-Ordered School Desegregation on Educational Attainment, by Race
Dependent variable:
Probability(Graduating from High School) Years of Education
Sample includes original sample PSID children born between 1951-70.  All models control for gender, age at most recent survey interview, and the following set of child 
family/neighborhood background factors: parental income, parental education, mother's marital status at birth, birth weight, parental smoking and alcohol use, neighborhood 
poverty rate, and neighborhood and housing quality indices.  The interaction terms of pre-'65 court orders with the other spline segments are suppressed to conserve space.  PSID 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Blacks Whites Blacks Whites
Years of Exposure to Major Desegregation Plan(age 5-17) 0.0292*** -0.0122 0.0800*** -0.0402
(0.0092) (0.0100) (0.0214) (0.0473)
(Initial year of court order - 1965), spline:
    ≤0 0.1155
(0.3136)
    Post-64 court order 4.8995***
(1.5397)
   >0 -0.0927**
(0.0366)
Individual > age 17  in year of initial court order 0.5708
(0.4063)
(Age in year of initial court order - 17)*                           
not beyond school-age in litigation yr -0.6403***
(0.0749)
Number of Individuals 2,154 1,057 572 1,378 633
Number of Childhood Families 690 362 241 394 254
Number of Childhood Neighborhoods 556 291 205 314 213
Number of School Districts 68 42 54 46 55
R-squared 0.8189
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at school district level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Sample includes original sample PSID children born between 1951-70 who grew up in large school districts that implemented major desegregation plans 
sometime during the 1960s or 70s (Welch/Light desegregation data). Models include race-specific controls for year of birth fixed effects, gender, age at most 
recent survey interview, and childhood family/neighborhood factors.












Exposure to Court-Ordered Desegregation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Main Effects apply to non-Hispanic Blacks) 
(Year aged 17 - Year of Initial Court Order), spline:
     <0 (no exposure, linear trend prior to court order) 0.0121 0.0025 0.0261 -0.0043 -2.3299 0.0326 -0.0055 -0.0026 -0.0013
(0.0352) (0.0351) (0.0349) (0.0237) (15.9044) (0.0604) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0056)
    (0 to 12) 0.0575* 0.0598** 0.0509* 0.0285* 38.6930* 0.0953* -0.0187*** -0.0174*** -0.0156***
(0.0316) (0.0260) (0.0267) (0.0148) (20.2173) (0.0561) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0047)
    (0 to 12)*#of yrs before '65 for pre-'65 court orders -- -- -- -- -17.0799*** -0.0204* 0.0046** 0.0044** 0.0041**
(6.1410) (0.0124) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
    >12 (beyond school-age years of exposure) -0.0241 -0.0270 -0.0263 -0.0012 -25.0001 0.0146 -0.0112 -0.0088 -0.0101
(0.0455) (0.0414) (0.0404) (0.0220) (38.6976) (0.0838) (0.0102) (0.0097) (0.0093)
     <0*White -0.0053 0.0100 0.0063 -0.0097 10.6585 0.0146 -0.0038 -0.0072 -0.0069
(0.0295) (0.0270) (0.0283) (0.0278) (12.6100) (0.0431) (0.0048) (0.0054) (0.0054)
    (0 to 12)*White -0.0509** -0.0454* -0.0395+ -0.0302* -37.0326** -0.0975** 0.0100** 0.0087* 0.0073+
(0.0227) (0.0273) (0.0290) (0.0175) (17.9770) (0.0423) (0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0047)
    (0 to 12)*(#of yrs before '65 for pre-'65 court orders)*White -- -- -- -- 0.9360 0.0166*** -0.0015** -0.0013* -0.0011+
(2.8892) (0.0064) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
     >12*White 0.0790 0.0873 0.0579 -0.0144 64.2180 -0.0117 0.0014 -0.0003 0.0003
(0.0619) (0.0616) (0.0618) (0.0267) (41.4063) (0.1030) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0096)
Total Effect for Whites, spline:
     <0 0.0068 0.0125 0.0324 -0.0140 8.3286 0.0472 -0.0093 -0.0098 -0.0082
    (0 to 12) 0.0066 0.0144 0.0114 -0.0017 1.6604 -0.0022 -0.0087 -0.0087 -0.0083
    (0 to 12)*#of yrs before '65 for pre-'65 court orders -- -- -- -- -16.1439 -0.0038 0.0031 0.0031 0.0030
     >12 0.0549 0.0603 0.0316 -0.0156 39.2179 0.0029 -0.0098 -0.0091 -0.0098
Child county fixed effects & Race-specific year of birth FE? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Race-specific region of birth fixed effects? no yes yes no no no no yes yes
Controls for Δchild county per-capita govt transfer programs? no no yes no no no no no yes
Number of person-year adult observations 6,808 6,808 6,808 6,808 16,002 64,863 64,863 64,863 64,863
Number of individuals 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,592 4,423 4,423 4,423 4,423
Number of childhood families 641 641 641 641 846 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366
Number of childhood neighborhoods 516 516 516 516 663 1,013 1,013 1,013 1,013
Number of school districts 116 116 116 116 127 147 147 147 147
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at school district level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (2-tailed test), + p<0.10 (one-tailed test)
Dependent variable:
Ln(Annual Earnings),                    
Men ages 30-45
Probability(Adult Poverty)
Sample includes PSID original sample children born b/w 1951-70 who grew up in school districts that were subject to court orders at some point b/w 1954-90. All models control for the following set of child 
family/neighborhood background factors: parental income, parental education, mother's marital status at birth, birth weight, parental smoking and alcohol use, neighborhood poverty rate, and neighborhood and 
housing quality indices, and columns (6)-(9) control for gender. Models include flexible controls for age (quadratic) and analyze adult economic outcomes for ages ≤45 to avoid conflating birth cohort and life 
cycle effects. Columns (1)-(4) simplify exposure specification by not including pre-'65 court order interaction terms because of smaller male-only sample for labor market outcomes; similar patterns of results 
when interactions are included. The interaction terms of pre-'65 court orders with the other spline segments (columns (5)-(9)) are suppressed to conserve space. PSID sample weights are used in all specifications 
to produce nationally-representative estimates. 
Table 3.  Effects of Court-Ordered School Desegregation on Adult Economic Outcomes, by Race(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Blacks Whites Blacks Whites Blacks Whites Blacks Whites Blacks Whites
Years of Exposure to Major 
Desegregation Plan(age 5-17) 0.0580** 0.0058 0.0219* -0.0032 39.0372* 12.1726 0.0399** -0.0677 -0.0220*** -0.0014
(0.0234) (0.0218) (0.0128) (0.0140) (22.2243) (20.6214) (0.0200) (0.0596) (0.0075) (0.0039)
Number of person-year observations 4,806 3,515 4,806 3,515 6,021 3,710 27,489 13,514 27,489 13,514
Number of Individuals 561 312 561 312 630 313 1,746 719 1,746 719
Number of Childhood Families 283 188 283 188 308 188 487 283 487 283
Number of Childhood Neighborhoods 232 166 232 166 250 166 381 233 381 233
Number of School Districts 37 51 37 51 39 51 47 55 47 55
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at school district level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Table 4.  2SLS/IV Estimates of Effects of Desegregation Plans on Adult Economic Attainment Outcomes, by Race
Second stage, Dependent variable:
Ln(Annual Earnings),       
Men ages 25-45
Probability(Adult Poverty)
Sample includes original sample PSID children born between 1951-70 who grew up in large school districts that implemented major desegregation plans sometime during the 1960s or 70s (Welch/Light 
desegregation data). Models include race-specific controls for year of birth fixed effects, gender, age, and childhood family/neighborhood factors.  The first-stage results are displayed in Table 2.










Blacks Whites All Men Blacks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Exposure to Desegregation Plan(age 5-17) -0.0071+
   (main effect applies to non-Hispanic Blacks) (0.0051)
Years of Exposure to Desegregation Plan*White                  0.0097+
(0.0076)
   Effect for Whites,  Exposure Yrs to Desegregation Plan 0.0026
Age when Desegregation Plan 1
st implemented:
   ≥18, no exposure (reference category)
   High School (dummy 0|1, age 15-17) -0.0362
(0.0580)
   Middle School (dummy 0|1, age 11-14) -0.0487
(0.0956)
   Elementary School (dummy 0|1, age ≤10) -0.0766**
(0.0375)
Age when Initial Court Order occurred:
   ≥18, no exposure (reference category)
   High School (dummy 0|1, age 15-17) -0.1528** -0.0763** -0.0071 0.0099
(0.0754) (0.0299) (0.0074) (0.0066)
   Middle School (dummy 0|1, age 11-14) -0.1174 -0.0599* -0.0073 0.0077
(0.0911) (0.0352) (0.0131) (0.0091)
   Elementary School (dummy 0|1, age ≤10) -0.2254** -0.1465*** -0.0378* -0.0003
(0.1010) (0.0410) (0.0212) (0.0103)
   Linear trend prior to court order,                                             
(18 - Age when 1
st court order)*no exposure 0.0015 0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0033**
(0.0074) (0.0051) (0.0008) (0.0017)
   Linear trend for pre-school years,                                            
Age ≤5 when initial court order occurred -0.0106 0.0145 -0.0060 0.0019
(0.0182) (0.0161) (0.0070) (0.0033)
Number of person-year adult observations -- -- 11,292 7,362 12,562 --
Number of individuals 452 904 830 464 1,335 624
Number of childhood families 239 385 357 279 662 316
Number of childhood neighborhoods 188 295 273 237 541 264
Number of school districts 54 67 64 81 64 38
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at school district level); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (2-tailed test), + p<0.10 (one-tailed test)
All models include race-specific year of birth fixed effects, controls for age (quadratic), and childhood family/neighborhood factors. Sample for 2SLS/IV 
estimates include original sample PSID children born between 1951-70 who grew up in large school districts that implemented major desegregation plans 
sometime during the 1960s or 70s (Welch/Light desegregation data). The first-stage results are displayed in Table 2.  Column (1) includes those with 
information from the 1995 survey IW crime module, who grew up in districts ever subject to court orders after 1964.  Deviant behavior is defined as ever 
expelled/suspended from school, charged with a crime, or ever incarcerated (column(1)).  Columns (3)-(5) are models of the annual incidence of 
incarceration.
Table 5.  Effects of Court-Ordered School Desegregation on the Likelihood of Incarceration among Men, by Race
Dependent variable:
Probability(Incarceration),            
ages 20-34
OLS Estimates 2SLS/IV Estimates
BlacksBlacks Whites
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years of Exposure to Major Desegregation Plan(age 5-17) 0.5222*** -0.1787
(0.1944) (0.2697)
(Main Effects apply to non-Hispanic Blacks) 
(Year aged 17 - Year of Initial Court Order), spline:
     <0 (no exposure, linear trend prior to court order) -0.3867* 0.1022 0.2039
(0.2120) (0.3813) (0.3975)
    (0 to 12) 0.2937** 0.5978* 0.5121+
(0.1369) (0.3633) (0.3775)
    (0 to 12)*#of yrs before '65 for pre-'65 court orders 0.0205 -0.1676* -0.1301+
(0.0361) (0.0968) (0.0990)
    >12 (beyond school-age years of exposure) 0.0348 0.2032 0.0734
(0.3949) (0.4643) (0.4821)
     <0*White 0.4663* 0.4567* 0.3933+
(0.2428) (0.2604) (0.2624)
    (0 to 12)*White -0.2780* -0.4734** -0.4613**
(0.1510) (0.1911) (0.1933)
    (0 to 12)*(#of yrs before '65 for pre-'65 court orders)*White 0.0112 0.0073 0.0040
(0.0433) (0.0351) (0.0354)
     >12*White -0.0726 -0.0640 -0.0357
(0.4874) (0.3613) (0.3718)
Total Effect for Whites, spline:
     <0 0.0796 0.5589 0.5972
    (0 to 12) 0.0157 0.1244 0.0508
    (0 to 12)*#of yrs before '65 for pre-'65 court orders 0.0317 -0.1603 -0.1261
     >12 -0.0378 0.1392 0.0377
Race-specific year of birth and region of birth fixed effects? yes yes yes yes yes
Childhood county fixed effects? no yes yes yes yes
Controls for Δchild county per-capita govt transfer programs? no no yes no no
Number of person-year adult observations 52,737 52,737 52,737 9,802 6,274
Number of individuals 5,494 5,494 5,494 1,104 655
Number of childhood families 2,069 2,069 2,069 366 267
Number of childhood neighborhoods 1,472 1,472 1,472 292 227
Number of school districts 330 330 330 42 55
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at school district level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (2-tailed test), + p<0.10 (one-tailed test)
All models include controls for age (quadratic), gender, childhood family/neighborhood factors, and an indicator dummy for 
districts ever subject to court orders b/w 1954-90 interacted with year of birth FE. Sample for 2SLS/IV estimates include those 
who grew up in large school districts that implemented major desegregation plans sometime during the 1960s or 70s 
(Welch/Light desegregation data). The first-stage results are displayed in Table 2.
Table 6.  Effects of Court-Ordered School Desegregation on Adult Health Status, by Race
Dependent variable:
Adult Health Status Index, ages 25-45                 
(Based on Interval Regression Model:                   
100pt-scale, 100=perfect health)
Interval Regression Estimates 2SLS/IV Estimates
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The Effect of Court-Ordered Desegregation on
Adult Health, by Race
Sample includes PSID original sample children born b/w 1951-70 who grew up in school districts that were subject to court orders at some point b/w 1954-90. Results based on 
regressions that include race-specific year of birth and region of birth fixed effects, controls for gender, & child family/neighborhood. Models include flexible controls for age 
(quadratic) and analyze adult outcomes for ages ≤45 to avoid conflating birth cohort and life cycle effects. Effects shown represent post-'64 court-orders. The point estimates for 
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The Effect of Court-Ordered Desegregation on
Adult Health, by RaceBlack White All Black White All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Exposure to Court-Ordered Desegregation(age 5-17) 0.1294* 0.0061 0.6417** -0.1506
(0.0729) (0.0950) (0.2941) (0.4022)
Ln(School district per-pupil spending)(age 12-17) 0.9635** 4.5134*
(0.3913) (2.7367)
Age - 30 -0.2850*** -0.2952*** -0.2704***
(0.0648) (0.0414) (0.0299)
Constant 12.5932*** 13.5622*** 13.4177*** 83.4535*** 88.8694*** 85.9419***
(1.1435) (1.1904) (0.7728) (3.7065) (6.0959) (7.5074)
Sibling Fixed Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Race-specific year of birth effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Table 7.
Long-run Effects of School Desegregation & School Quality on Educational Attainment & Adult Health:
Sibling Fixed Effect Estimates
general health status in adulthood  




Race specific year of birth effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Robust Standard errors in parentheses (clustered on school)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note:  All models include controls for age squared, age cubed, gender, year of birth, birth order, birth weight, whether born into a two-parent family, and parental income 
(coefficients supressed to conserve space).Adult Family 
Income-to-Needs 
Ratio
Probability       
(Adult Poverty)
Adult Health 
Status Index      
Exposure to Court-Ordered Desegregation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yrs of Exposure to Court-Ordered Desegregation(age 5-17) 0.2510*** 0.1949** 0.2596*** 0.0761** -0.0173*** 0.5322+
(0.0587) (0.0812) (0.0803) (0.0329) (0.0059) (0.3272)
Yrs of Exposure to Court-Ordered Desegregation*              
↑ΔPer-Pupil Spending(t-1,t+3) 0.0892*** 0.0764** 0.0515** -0.0057+ 0.3763*
(0.0311) (0.0358) (0.0215) (0.0038) (0.2034)
Yrs of Exposure to Court-Ordered Desegregation*              
↑ΔBlack-White Exposure Index(t-1,t+3) 0.0106 0.0093
(0.0110) (0.0116)
Sample from districts initially subject to court orders ≥1964? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year of birth fixed effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Childhood county fixed effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of adult person-year observations -- -- -- 23,770 23,770 9,847
Number of Individuals 1,193 915 915 1,493 1,493 991
Number of Childhood Families 342 270 270 402 402 293
Number of Childhood Neighborhoods 256 217 217 300 300 218
Number of School Districts 51 43 43 51 51 50
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at school district level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (2-tailed test), + p<0.10 (one-tailed test)
Years of Education
Dependent variable:
Table 8.  Interactive Effects of Court-Ordered School Desegregation & Induced-Change in Per-Pupil Spending on                                
Black's Adult Socioeconomic & Health Attainments
Sample restricted to PSID original sample black children who grew up in school districts that were initially subject to court order sometime after 1963 for which I have 
school district per-pupil spending (school segregation) information 1 year before and 3 years after initial court order, obtained from school district finance data (1962-82) 
and OCR school data (1968-82).  The estimated district-specific induced-change in per-pupil spending (school segregation) are net of school district fixed effects and region-
specific time trends; these changes are centered around the respective average change ($1,000 for per-pupil spending; 0.15 for black-white exposure index) in the model, so 
that the main effects capture the average desegregation impact (see also Figures 1-3).  Models include same set of control variables as in Tables 1&3. Years of 
Education    
Ln(Wage),    

















5-Year Exposure to Desegregation 0.4000*** 0.1095*** 195.1860*** 0.1995*** -0.1100*** -0.0355** 2.6110***
Implied Wald Estimate of                        
Returns to Education (quantity/quality) -- 0.2738 487.9650 0.4988 0.2750 0.0888 6.5275
Mean for Blacks (at age 30) 12.8 2.2478 1,645.8 2.2294 0.2977
0.0137          
0.212 (ever) 83.8612
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Table 9.  Effects of Desegregation Exposure on Blacks' Adult Outcomes & the Returns to Education
Dependent variable:
This sumary table contains the main results for blacks based on estimates shown in Tables 1-6. All models include race-specific year of birth fixed effects, and controls 
for region of birth, age (quadratic), gender, and childhood family/neighborhood factors. Sample includes original sample PSID children born between 1951-70 who 
grew up in school districts that had desegregation court litigation at some point b/w 1954-90 (desegregation court case data, American Communities Project; 
Welch/Light).Appendix A: Data Sources 
 
A.  Desegregation Court Case Data 
The desegregation court case data contains the universe of desegregation court cases in the US from 
1954-90 assembled by the team of legal scholars for The American Community Project in association 
with Brown University (directed by John Logan).  Every court case is coded according to whether it 
involved segregation of students across schools, whether the court required a desegregation remedy, and 
what was the main component of the desegregation plan.  Multiple sources were used to compile the 
comprehensive desegregation case inventory.  Every case was checked against legal databases, including 
Westlaw, to confirm the name of the case, the school districts involved, whether the case actually covered 
the issue of school segregation, whether there was a court-ordered plan, the type of desegregation plan, 
and the year of the initial court order.  The resultant case inventory is significantly more comprehensive 
than the one obtained by use of data in Welch and Light (1987) alone.  The total case inventory includes 
358 court cases, which resulted in desegregation plans involving 1,057 school districts.  
 
Structure of Data & Information Compiled for each Court Case:  
•  Case Name:  
•  Year of Initial Decision:  
•  Did the case relate to school segregation?  
•  Did the court require a desegregation plan, affirm an existing plan, or refer to a previous 
case requiring a plan?  
•  If so, what did the plan require?  
•  Description of Court Case:  
•  Current status of this court case, or if there was a plan, the status of the plan (if known):  
•  Year of Current status:  
•  Was there a U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) action?  
•  Year of HEW Action:  
•  Description of HEW Action:  
 
B.  Desegregation Plan Implementation Data 
I augment this data with major desegregation plan implementation information in large school districts 
originally compiled by Welch and Light (1987).  Welch/Light investigated desegregation histories of 125 
mostly large school districts.  Welch and Light (1987) report the year in which school desegregation was 
implemented for each school district.  The Welch/Light data cover all districts that in 1968 were 20 to 90 
percent minority with enrollments of 50,000+, and a random sample of districts that were 10-90 percent 
minority with enrollments of between 15,000-50,000. 
 
C.  School Data 
The school quality, teacher salary, and school segregation data covering the period of the 1960s, 70s, and 
80s come from four sources:   
(1) Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the US Department of Health and Human Services, data for 
1968-1982.  OCR produced data containing school enrollment statistics broken down by race and 
school segregation indices for a large sample of the nation’s school districts. 
(2) Census of Governments, School District Finance Data, 1962-1982.  
(3) The Common Core data (CCD) compiled by the National Center for Education Statistics is an 
annual, national statistical database that contains detailed revenue and expenditure data for all 
public elementary and secondary schools and school agencies and school districts in the US.   
(4) The multiple sources used to compile the comprehensive desegregation case inventory (1954-
1990) assembled by the team of scholars for The American Community Project at Brown 
University included case dockets and bibliographies for all desegregation court orders from the Department of Justice, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the US Department of Education 
(Logan et al., 2008). 
 
I have merged this desegregation court case data and information on major plan implementation year with 
district-level enrollment data from the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) Data and Common Core of Data and 
as collected by Welch and Light for the Office of Civil Rights.  The enrollment data is used to calculate 
school segregation dissimilarity and exposure indices.  I am grateful to Sarah Reber for sharing the OCR 
school data with me (as described further below).  
 
The data on school district spending, student enrollments, and numbers of teachers are obtained from the 
Census of Government (COG) for the available years from 1962-92. I use the version of the COG 
contained in the Historical Database on Individual Government Finance -- a longitudinally consistent 
version of the COG produced by the Census Bureau. The COG data are organized at the level of the 
school district. These figures are converted to 2000 dollars using the CPI-deflator.  Per-pupil school 
expenditures is total expenditures by the district divided by total student enrollment. 
 
Data on student-teacher ratios at the school level are not available before 1968.  Student-teacher ratios by 
race are calculated from Office of Civil Rights (OCR) data. The OCR data (described below) contain 
information on the number of teachers in every school, as well as the number of black students and the 
total number of students. To calculate the black student-teacher ratio for 1970-1972, I calculated the 
student-teacher ratio (total students, any race, divided by total teachers, any race) in every school; I then 
calculated the weighted average student-teacher ratio for schools in each district, with black enrollment in 
the school as weights.  For example, the analyses that analyze desegregation effects on average class size 
by race using school-level data, include 14,869 schools from 667 districts from 33 different states. 
 
D.  Sources of Data on Segregation 
I use data from the surveys conducted by the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the Office of Education to 
estimate the measures of segregation for school districts from 1968-1976. The exposure of blacks to 
whites is the percent white in schools, weighted by black enrollment and vice-versa for exposure of 
whites to blacks; data on racial composition at the school level are required to calculate these indexes. I 
obtained from Sarah Reber the original binary EBCDIC data files for the OCR surveys for 1968-1974 and 
1976 (the survey was not conducted in 1975), who converted the files to ASCII for analysis. Similar 
school-level data on students and teachers by race were published for 1967 by the Office of Education; 
these data were entered for analysis. The exposure indexes where then calculated based on the school 
level enrollment by race.  The OCR surveys were not comprehensive in all years, but the large size of 
school districts and the heavy representation of districts that had involvement of the courts in 
desegregating its schools ensured that most districts with significant minority student enrollment were 
included in the data in most years.  Before the 1967 school year, no school-level data on enrollment by 
race are available. 
 
The demographic data on districts/counties are obtained from the 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 decennial 
censuses. I use versions of the census data summarized at the geographic level of the census tract.  
 
E.  Pre-Existing County Characteristics 
The pre-existing demographic, socioeconomic, and school-related characteristics at the county level were 
obtained originally from the county tabulations of the 1960/2 Census, were taken from the City and 
County Databook. 
 
I am grateful to Doug Almond, Hilary Hoynes, and Diane Schazenbach for sharing the Regional 
Economic Information System (REIS) data for the 1959 to 1978 period.  Per capita county transfer payments include measures for public assistance (AFDC, General Assistance), medical care (Medicare, 
Medicaid, military), and retirement and disability benefits. 
 
F.  Matching PSID Individuals to their Childhood School Districts 
 
In order to limit the possibility that school district boundaries were drawn in response to pressure for 
desegregation, I utilize 1970 school district geographies. The “69-70 School District Geographic 
Reference File” (Bureau of Census, 1970) relates census tract and school district geographies. For each 
census tract in the country, it provides the fraction of the population that is in each school district. Using 
this information, I aggregate census tracts to 1970 district geographies with Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) software. I assign census tracts from 1960, 1980 and 1990 to school districts using this 
resulting digital map based on their centroid locations. 
 
To construct demographic information on 1970-definition school districts, I compile census data from the 
tract, place, school district and county levels of aggregation for 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990. I construct 
digital (GIS) maps of 1970 geography school districts using the 1969-1970 School District Geographic 
Reference File from the Census. This file indicates the fraction by population of each census tract that fell 
in each school district in the country. Those tracts split across school districts I allocated to the school 
district comprising the largest fraction of the tract’s population. Using the resulting 1970 central school 
district digital maps, I allocate tracts in 1960, 1980 and 1990 to central school districts or suburbs based 
on the locations of their centroids. The 1970 definition central districts located in regions not tracted in 
1970 all coincide with county geography which I use instead. 
 
Algorithm for Matching Individuals to Schools 
 
The school data from the OCR, Census of Governments, and Common Core of Data are merged to the 
individual-level geocoded version of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for original sample children 
based on the census block where they grew up.  Based on the school district of upbringing, I compute for 
each individual the average per-pupil school spending, student-to-teacher ratio, and school segregation 
levels experienced during their school-age years (as well as averaged over their adolescent years (ages 12-
17)); similarly I compute for each individual the county per-capita transfer payments from income-
support programs averaged over their school-age and adolescent years.   
 
The criterion for a match is outlined below. The earliest criteria the individual meets is how the merge is 
accomplished.  If there is one high school in the individual’s census block/tract, then the individual is 
assigned the characteristics of that school.  If there are multiple high schools in the individual’s census 
block/tract and all high schools are in the same district, then the individual is assigned the mean 
characteristics of the high schools in the block/tract.  If there are multiple high schools in the individual’s 
census block/tract that do not belong to the same district, attempts were made to identify which high 
school is correct based on census place (city), and the individual is assigned the characteristics of this 
school; if this is not possible, the individual is assigned the mean characteristics of the high schools in the 
zip code.  If there is one elementary or middle school in the individual’s census block/tract, and the school 
is a member of a district that contains at least one high school, then the individual is assigned the mean 
characteristics of the high school or high schools in the district associated with the elementary school. If 
there are multiple elementary or middle schools in the individual’s block/tract, and these schools belong 
to different school districts, attempts were made to identify which school district is correct based on 
census place (city), and the individual is assigned the mean characteristics of the high schools in the 
district associated with the school. If this is not possible, the individual is assigned the mean of the high 
schools associated with the school districts.  The individual is matched to the mean of the school districts 
in the childhood county of residence. 
 APPENDIX B: A BRIEF HISTORY OF US SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
 
Background.  Residential segregation may affect access to quality schools and subsequent 
mobility by reducing school resources (e.g., school district per-pupil spending, class size, teacher quality).  
During the 1950s, 60s, and 70s when the individuals in the PSID sample were school-age, there was 
substantial variation across districts in school quality inputs (e.g., per-pupil spending, pupil/teacher 
ratio…).  During this time period, there was limited state support for K-12 education (in the vast majority 
of states) and a heavy reliance on local property taxes.  During the 1960s and 70s, states, on average, 
contributed roughly 40 percent of the cost of K-12 education, and much of this aid was a flat per pupil 
payment that was not related to local property wealth of the district (National Center for Education 
Statistics). 
Before school desegregation plans were enacted, school district spending, particularly in the 
South, was directed disproportionately to the majority-white schools within districts, something which is 
not evident from district-level spending data.  While the premise of the 1954 Brown decision was 
“separate is inherently unequal”, the Brown decision alone was not sufficient to compel school districts to 
integrate.  Minimal school desegregation occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s following the Brown I 
and II rulings issued in 1954 and 1955.   
Most school districts did not adopt major school desegregation plans until forced to do so by 
court order (or threat of litigation) due to individual cases filed in local Federal court.  Civil rights 
organizations avoided taking on legal cases early on that had a high risk of failure, even if the potential 
local benefits were large.  The cascading impacts that would accompany legal victory due to the role of 
precedent juxtaposed with the potential risks of losing outweighed considerations of where targeted 
efforts would have the greatest impacts or where impacts would be felt for the largest number of blacks in 
the short-run.  As the recorded legal history of desegregation documents, the legal arm of the NAACP 
(Legal Defense & Educational Fund)…“followed a strategic approach that rejected simple accumulation 
of big cases, in favor of incremental victories that built a favorable legal climate…” (Council for Public 
Interest Law, 1976, p.37).
i  Guryan (2004) presents this intuition formally in a model that demonstrates 
that in an environment in which precedent has a strong effect on the subsequent probability of success, an 
agent with the objective of desegregating the nation’s schools should optimally choose to prioritize the 
likelihood of success almost to the exclusion of any local benefits of desegregation when choosing where 
to bring litigation.   
 
Timeline of School Integration in the US 
At the time of the Brown decision in 1954, seventeen southern states and the nation’s capitol 
required that all public schools be racially segregated (Figure A1).  The Supreme Court did not set a time 
table for dismantling school segregation and turned the implementation of desegregation over to US 
district courts.  The aftermath of Brown and process to see desegregation established in public schools 
can be characterized as consisting of several developmental periods—from neonatal and infancy (1954-
65) to adolescence (1966-75) and young adulthood (1976-1989).  The post-Brown era up through the 
mid-to late 1980s can be codified by two distinct periods: pre- and post-1965.  The 1954-65 period was 
characterized by Southern states’ intent to thwart implementation of Brown and resist compliance with 
the desegregation orders.  The South’s massive resistance to the Court’s rulings ensued for the next 10 
years and the delay tactics were initially very successful.  The case-by-case litigation approach largely 
failed during the first decade following Brown.  Legal scholar Walter Gellhorn described the pace of 
desegregation during these years as that “of an extraordinarily arthritic snail” (cited in Wilkinson, From 
Brown to Bakke, p. 102).  By 1965, only 2 percent of African American children in the Deep South 
attended integrated schools and more than 75 percent of the schools in the South remained segregated. 
 
Landmark Court Decisions on the Road from Segregation to Desegregation & Integration 
Enforcement of desegregation did not begin in earnest until the mid-1960s.  State and federal 
dollars proved to be the most effective incentives to desegregate the schools.  A critical turning point was the enactment of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA) and Title I funds of the 1965 Elementary & 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which prohibited federal aid to segregated schools and allowed the 
Justice Department to join suits against school districts that were in violation of the Brown vs. Board 
order to integrate.  The congressional enactment of ESEA was among the most important events in 
effecting compliance because it dramatically raised the amount of federal aid to education; from a few 
million to more than one billion dollars a year; and, for the first time, the threat of withholding federal 
funds became a powerful inducement to comply with federal desegregation orders (Cascio et al., 2010; 
Holland, 2004).   
Figure A6 presents a map of the geographic variation in school spending in the US in 1962 
overlaid with the residential locations of minorities in that year.  The map illustrates the concentration of 
minorities in the South where school district per-pupil spending levels were lowest.  Another example of 
how financial incentives played a role in facilitating compliance is evident in President Nixon’s proposal 
to provide financial incentives to school districts to comply with desegregation orders, which led to 
congressional enactment of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 to assist the federal courts in 
achieving desegregation (Ehrlander, 2002, p. 23).  Federal dollars soon constituted 30 percent of the 
budget of many Southern school systems.  The availability of federal money continued to influence 
desegregation into the 1980s.  I find a significant correlation in the amount of federal funds received by 
school districts in the years 1966-1970 with the percentage of black students enrolled in previously all-
white schools. 
The landmark court decision of 1968 in Green v. School Board of New Kent County required 
immediate actions to effectively implement desegregation plans that promised to work right away.  The 
1968 Green decision led to an acceleration of desegregation activity and set the pattern for a number of 
court-orders and desegregation plans that followed in many other districts across the country.  Following 
the Supreme Court ruling in Green, the various Courts of Appeals held that desegregation plans based on 
“freedom of choice”, or zoning which followed traditional residential patterns, were inadequate and 
deemed no longer acceptable.  School desegregation encompassed not only the abolition of dual 
attendance systems for students, but also the merging into one system of faculty, staff, and services, so 
that no school could be marked as either a ''black'' or a ''white'' school. 
In 1970, the Court approved busing, magnet schools, and compensatory education as permissible 
tools of school desegregation policy (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education), and the 
ruling was among the first attempts to implement a large-scale urban desegregation plan.  Schools in other 
regions of the country remained segregated until the mid-1970s and these districts began accelerating 
school desegregation efforts after the 1973 Keyes vs. Denver School District decision (413 U.S. 189), 
which ruled that court-ordered litigation applied to areas which had not practiced de jure segregation.  
This case was the first involving school desegregation from a major non-Southern city, and it marked the 
beginning of large-scale desegregation plans in regions outside the South.  The case also ushered in a 
period of equal desegregation efforts in both the North and the South, regardless of whether the school 
segregation resulted from state action (legal mandate) or residential segregation patterns.  Desegregation 
cases began to expand explicit goals beyond racial integration to include goals of promoting adequacy of 
school funding for minority student achievement.  The 1977 Milliken II decision allowed courts to 
mandate spending on compensatory educational programs for minority students.  This occurred in Los 
Angeles and Detroit, for example.  No other important court decisions occurred between 1975 and 1990. 
 
School Desegregation Data: The Nature, Pattern, and Timing of Initial Court Orders & Implementation 
Most previous studies have not had access to data on the nature and timing of desegregation 
policy and action, and have been limited primarily to an examination of "white flight" and/or have been 
geographically limited.  I provide analysis of school desegregation policy to describe aspects of the nature 
and timing of steps taken to desegregate the schools, which is instructive for the empirical approach 
pursued to identify its impacts. 
Extent of Desegregation Actions (post-1965 period).  Substantial steps to desegregate schools 
during the period 1966-75 are reported in an estimated 1,400 school districts. While these districts represent a small proportion of the 19,000 school districts in the country, they encompass about half of 
the minority public school children in the country. Although the actions to desegregate were most heavily 
concentrated in the Southern and Border States, such actions were found in a moderate number of districts 
in other regions of the country as well.   
Nature of Pressure to Desegregate (pre- vs. post-1965 period).  In many districts, desegregation 
was a process that came as a result of pressures from many sources.  As the major impetus, court orders 
were most often reported in districts with high initial levels of segregation and with moderate-to-high 
proportions of minority students.  Districts which desegregated under local pressures generally had low 
initial levels of segregation and low proportions of minority students.  Figure A2 presents the dates of 
initial court orders and resultant major school desegregation plan implementation across the country 
among the 1,057 school districts that introduced such plans between 1954 and 1980.  In the South, the 
largest share of school districts desegregated over the five-year period between 1968 and 1972, and 
school segregation declined to a far larger extent in the South relative to the rest of the country over this 
period. 
Most desegregation plans implemented prior to 1965 were minor (referred to as “freedom of 
choice” plans), were not strictly enforced, and achieved only token levels of integration.  My focus will be 
on the impacts of major desegregation plans whose implementation accelerated after 1965 coupled with 
actions spurred by the 1968 Green decision.  The desegregation activity that took place after 1965 was in 
stark contrast with that of earlier years.  As shown in Figure A2, the change in the pace of desegregation 
litigation activity and plan implementation after 1965 is striking.  Many districts took steps overnight that 
changed the school systems from being predominantly segregated to predominantly desegregated.  These 
steps were often taken subsequent to a specific court order or following direct threat from the US 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to cut off Federal funds.  The nature of timing of 
initial court litigation was highly idiosyncratic.  Court-ordered desegregation by legal mandate is 
plausibly more exogenous than other more voluntary forms of desegregation.  The extent of voluntary 
desegregation prior to court intervention varied across districts, but voluntary action of districts was more 
endogenous.  As well, anti-integration groups can delay major desegregation plan implementation by 
lengthening the court proceedings or by implementing inadequate desegregation plans; thus, the timing of 
initial court orders is likely more plausibly exogenous than the actual implementation date of major 
desegregation plans (additional evidence provided near the end of this Appendix).   
In Figure A3, I present evidence on the length of time between initial court order and major 
desegregation plan implementation.  We see this lag exhibits a clear structural break in 1965 (Figure A3).  
Namely, the results suggests that for initial court orders meted out after 1965, there is roughly immediate 
implementation (on average, major plan implemented within 1-2 yrs of initial court order); and the lag 
does not differ over time for court orders after 1965.  On the other hand, for initial court orders meted out 
before 1965, there is more than a 10-year delay in implementation of a major plan (following initial court 
order, major plan is not implemented, on average, for 10 years; there is a systematic long delay that 
decreases in years leading up to 1965.  During the 1955-64 period (after Brown but prior to the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act), the earlier the initial court order, the longer the delay in implementation of a major 
plan.  This pattern and discontinuity after 1965 in the time lag between initial court order and major 
desegregation plan implementation occurs in the South and non-South.   
In 1964, 1 percent of African American students in the South attended school with whites; by 
1968, this had risen to 32 percent.  As shown in Figure A2, the ensuing years of 1968-1972 bracket the 
period of maximum desegregation activity.  Figure A4 presents a map that summarizes the overall 
geographic pattern and timing of initial court orders overlaid with the childhood residential locations of 
the (nationally-representative) PSID sample of black and white children in 1968; and, analogously, Figure 
A5 shows this for the resultant subsequent major desegregation plan implementation in US school 
districts/counties
ii (among the subset of districts for which this information is available).  The figures 
demonstrate the strong overlap of residential locations of original sample PSID children with districts that 
underwent court-ordered desegregation.     In the figure, districts that were subject to court orders are shaded (no shading indicates no court-
ordered desegregation); the shading of the districts/counties is assigned by its initial court order date, with 
darker shading denoting a later initial court ruling. The lightest gray represents communities in which the 
initial court order occurred between 1954 and 1963—the early desegregation period; and the next darkest 
gray shades denotes communities in which the initial court order occurred between 1964-1968 during the 
expansion of federal enforcement as a “national emphasis program” and under Title VI of the 1964 CRA 
and Title I of the 1965 ESEA; the next darkest grays indicate communities in which the initial court order 
occurred between 1968 and 1972 during the expansion following the 1968 Green Supreme Court ruling; 
the darkest gray and black represent the corresponding smaller number of communities in which the 
initial court order occurred between 1974 to 1980 and after 1980, respectively.  Not surprisingly, the 
concentration of activity occurred in places with at least a 20 percent black population.  A substantial 
portion of the US population of minority children in 1960 lived in the shaded 857 districts/counties that 
eventually were subject to court-ordered desegregation.     
As shown, districts exhibit a great deal of variation in the year in which the initial court order was 
issued and the subsequent timing when major desegregation plan implementation actually took place; this 
variation is evidenced both within and across regions of the country.  In most regions, the initial court 
order took place in a narrower period than the 30-year period observed in the country as a whole; 
similarly, the span in timing of major desegregation plan implementation is narrower within regions than 
across the country as a whole.  The regional pattern and clustering reflects the evolution of legal 
precedent.  Figure A7 highlights the significant birth cohort variation in childhood exposure to court-
ordered school desegregation for the PSID sample.  The share of children exposed to school 
desegregation orders increases significantly with year of birth over the 1950-1975 birth cohorts analyzed 
in the PSID sample. 
Only token desegregation efforts occurred prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  The 
figure shows that litigation and desegregation plan implementation accelerated substantially between 
1964 and 1972.  For example, only 6 percent of the districts that would eventually undergo court-ordered 
desegregation had implemented major plans by 1968 (when the PSID began); by 1972 this rose to over 56 
percent.  It is this period of substantial growth in litigation activity, spurred by landmark court cases like 
the 1968 Green decision, that forms the basis of the research design.  By 1976, 45 percent of the South's 
African American students were attending majority-white schools, compared with just 28 percent in the 
Northeast and 30 percent in the Midwest.   
The process became highly decentralized with a diverse set of agents that initiated court litigation 
following the Brown decision, which also contributed to the idiosyncratic nature of the timing and 
location where legal challenges arose that resulted in initial court orders.
iii  Differences across districts in 
when desegregation court cases were first filed and the length of time it took these cases to proceed 
through the judicial system represents a plausibly exogenous source of identifying variation in the timing 
of school desegregation.  The exogeneity of this timing is supported theoretically by the documented legal 
history of school desegregation and by my own empirical examination of the issue below. 
The primary identification strategy uses this variation in the timing of major desegregation plan 
implementation that was induced by differences in the year of the initial court order.  Systematic variation 
in desegregation plan adoption could lead to spurious estimates of the plans’ impact if those same school 
district characteristics are associated with differential trends in the outcomes of interest.  To explore this, I 
compiled characteristics of school districts in 1962, prior to the surge of court-ordered desegregation 
cases and significant integration efforts that ensued in subsequent years (of the same decade).  I use these 
“pre” characteristics to predict the year in which the initial court order took place and the year in which 
the school district actually implemented a major desegregation plan, respectively.   
The 1962 county measures used as independent variables in the model include: the log(county 
population), percent of the population that is minority, per-capita school spending, the percent of school 
spending that comes from intergovernmental grants (state/federal), median income, percent of households 
with income <$3,000 (in 1961 dollars), percent of households with income >$10,000, percent with 12 or 
more years of education, population change between 1950-60, percent of residents in an urban area, percent of residents in rural or farm area, percent of residents living in group quarters, median age, 
percent of residents that are school-age, percent of residents 65 or older, percent of residents that voted 
for the incumbent President, and the county mortality rate (all constructed from the 1962 Census of 
Governments, City & County Data Book).  I include the size of the population to capture the fact that 
large districts/counties may face differential costs and opposition to the desegregation process.  I also 
estimate an alternative model specification that includes the 1962 average student-to-teacher ratio and 
average teacher salary, instead of the per-capita school spending level (as shown in Table A1, similar 
patterns emerge).  These data are linked with the desegregation court case and plan implementation data.   
  Columns (1)-(6) of Table A1 presents estimates from least-squares regressions of the year each 
school district had an initial court order (among those that first became subject to court order after 1962) 
on 1962 characteristics and region fixed effects, while the final two columns ((7)-(8)) use the same set of 
independent variables to examine determinants of the delay between the initial court order and major 
desegregation plan implementation (in years).  Column (1) shows estimates for the full sample, column 
(3)-(8) show results for the subset of counties in which original sample PSID children grew up, and 
columns (5)-(8) display results for the subsample of counties for which information is available on the 
dates of major desegregation plan implementation. 
The magnitude of the association between the school district characteristics and the year of the 
initial court order is weak.  I find that districts that had either significant minority proportion, larger per-
capita school spending, teacher salary, smaller average student-to-teacher ratios, or greater income, 
generally did not experience an initial court order earlier or later than other districts (columns 1-6); 
however, these characteristics are significant predictors of the delay between the initial court order and 
major desegregation plan implementation (columns 7-8).  Aside from differences in population 
concentration, only the proportion of the population with 12 or more years of education significantly 
predict coming under court order later; while the proportion of the population that is school-age is 
predictive of coming under court order sooner.  Because parental education, neighborhood SES 
characteristics, and region of birth will be included in regression specifications, this correlation need not 
be a threat to the internal validity of the analysis.  Interestingly, holding spending levels constant, districts 
that received a greater proportion of 1962 school spending from state and federal sources were more 
likely to have initial court orders sooner.  This pattern may be expected if intergovernmental grants result 
in the financial ramifications of desegregation to not be borne solely by local residents, which may lessen 
opposition to desegregation implementation.  Furthermore, I find that neither urbanicity, the proportion of 
the population in rural areas, nor the county mortality rate is generally predictive of the timing of initial 
court orders.  While these regression results show a few statistically significant impacts of district 
characteristics on the timing of the initial court order, the quantitative importance of these predictors is 
small and most of the variation remains unexplained.  I find little evidence that pre-treatment 
characteristics significantly predict the timing of court orders.
iv   
On the other hand, I find that districts with a larger minority population, greater per-capita school 
spending, and smaller proportion of residents with low income are each strongly associated with longer 
delays in major desegregation implementation following the initial court order.  These results are 
consistent with the legal history of school desegregation, and suggest that the timing of initial court 
litigation is more plausibly exogenous than the timing of major desegregation plan implementation.  In 
sum, the idiosyncratic nature of court litigation timing documented in the legal history of school 
desegregation make a prima facie case for treating initial court orders as exogenous shocks, which 
influenced the timing of major desegregation plan implementation and generated changes in school 
quality from abrupt shifts in racial school segregation.  This case is bolstered by the empirical evidence 
that the bulk of 1962 district/county characteristics fail to predict the timing of initial court orders. 
 
                                                 
i An elaborate discussion of the legal history of the school desegregation court decisions and the strategy used by the 
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No Major Plan Implementation
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The Geographic Timing of Implementation of
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PSID White Children (Blue Dot)
# 1 Dot = 1
PSID Black Children (Red Dot)
# 1 Dot = 1




The Geographic Timing of Implementation of
Court-Ordered School Desegregation Plans in Large Districts1962 County variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log population -0.8040*** -0.8541*** -0.1439 0.4198 -1.3639 -1.9489* 1.1884 1.3207
(0.2768) (0.2847) (0.8200) (0.8907) (1.0195) (1.0794) (0.9768) (1.1221)
Percent minority, spline (< 20) 0.0877* 0.0858* -0.1660 -0.1629 -0.1791 -0.0635 0.2001 0.1527
(0.0449) (0.0450) (0.1486) (0.1489) (0.2081) (0.2123) (0.1943) (0.2085)
Percent minority, spline (≥ 20) -0.0159 -0.0182 -0.0322 0.0026 -0.1762 -0.1913 0.5389** 0.5381**
(0.0253) (0.0252) (0.1125) (0.1136) (0.2520) (0.2547) (0.2359) (0.2568)
Per-capita school spending ($000s) 0.0082 0.5960 -2.3282 5.4804**
(0.0162) (1.3015) (2.1433) (2.2330)
% of school spending revenue from state/fed govt -0.0899*** -0.0940*** -0.1298** -0.1043 -0.0833 -0.0805 0.0684 0.0758
(0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0655) (0.0666) (0.0879) (0.0877) (0.0825) (0.0877)
Student-to-teacher ratio -0.0039 -0.2896 0.1965 -0.3806
(0.0311) (0.1787) (0.1867) (0.2894)
Average teacher salary 0.0005 -0.0020 0.0021 0.0014
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Median income -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0033 0.0086 0.0062 -0.0207*** -0.0210***
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0065) (0.0070)
% of households with income <$3,000 0.0713 0.0761 0.1065 0.1170 0.8007 0.4575 -2.5174*** -2.4205***
(0.1005) (0.0996) (0.3589) (0.3594) (0.6187) (0.6321) (0.5757) (0.6244)
% of households with income > $10,000 0.1178 0.1065 -0.0208 0.0416 -0.0672 -0.0378 0.8514+ 0.9291
(0.1377) (0.1380) (0.3786) (0.3807) (0.7080) (0.7071) (0.6280) (0.6656)
% of adults with 12 or more years of education 0.0877** 0.0903** 0.2574** 0.1992* -0.2369 -0.1699 -0.0071 0.0009
(0.0393) (0.0396) (0.1070) (0.1116) (0.1660) (0.1732) (0.1606) (0.1788)
1950-60 population change 0.0050 0.0051 -0.0232 -0.0191 -0.0016 -0.0041 -0.0184 -0.0159
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0220) (0.0232)
% of residents in urban areas 0.0060 0.0058 -0.0437 -0.0402 0.0339 0.0282 -0.0199 -0.0150
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0595) (0.0591) (0.1150) (0.1145) (0.1147) (0.1214)
% of residents in rural or farm area 0.0352 0.0361 0.1822 0.1970 0.2554 0.3849 0.5533 0.4997
(0.0248) (0.0256) (0.1279) (0.1281) (0.4184) (0.4209) (0.4473) (0.4840)
% living in group quarters 0.0617 0.0568 0.1397 0.1957 0.3980 0.3673 -0.1526 -0.2322
(0.0534) (0.0586) (0.2185) (0.2196) (0.2847) (0.2860) (0.2866) (0.3074)
Median age -0.4279** -0.4281** -1.3912*** -1.4594*** -0.4847 -0.2984 -0.3123 -0.1917
(0.1754) (0.1747) (0.5256) (0.5283) (1.0443) (1.0532) (1.0220) (1.0951)
% of residents who are school-age (5-20) -0.2907 -0.2933 -2.2507*** -2.4145*** -0.9571 -0.5218 0.1894 0.1512
(0.1894) (0.1911) (0.6443) (0.6489) (1.1669) (1.2006) (1.1408) (1.2355)
% of residents who are elderly (65+) 0.2258 0.2209 0.1049 -0.0283 0.7359 0.6766 0.0935 0.0097
(0.2039) (0.2046) (0.6581) (0.6616) (0.8173) (0.8171) (0.8227) (0.8788)
% who voted for incumbent President 0.0615 0.0508 0.2834** 0.3241** 0.0059 -0.0241 0.0204 0.0579
(0.0444) (0.0468) (0.1237) (0.1252) (0.1801) (0.1830) (0.1636) (0.1818)
Mortality rate (annual deaths per 10,000 residents) -0.6088 -0.6125 -16.0529* -13.7160 -14.4197 -11.1113 5.1065 2.7650
(1.8752) (1.8842) (9.0305) (9.0891) (14.2740) (14.1562) (14.5443) (15.3410)
Region controls? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Full sample? yes yes no no no no no no
Subsample that overlaps PSID original sample kids? no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Subsample with desegregation implementation dates? no no no no yes yes yes yes
Observations 616 616 161 161 62 62 62 62
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Data: 1962 Census of Governments, City & County Data Book; Desegregation court case data compiled by legal scholars for American Communities Project/Brown University; 
Major desegregation plan implementation dates obtained from Welch/Light data.
Table A1: Determinants of the Timing of Court-Ordered School Desegregation Using 1962 County Characteristics
Dependent variable:
Initial Year of Court Order
Delay b/w Initial Court Order & 
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1962 County Minority Population (per 100 residents)
# 1 Dot = 15
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1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Year of birth
All Children Black Children
PSID individuals born 1947-1975, followed up to 2007.
Birth Cohort Variation in Childhood



















































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Year of birth
95% CI Black Children
PSID individuals born 1947-1975, followed up to 2007.
Birth Cohort Variation in Childhood
Exposure to Court-Ordered School DesegregationYears of 
Education      
Ln(Annual 
Earnings),     











Years of Exposure to Unsuccessful 
Desegregation Court Litigation(age 5-17) 0.0131 -0.0035 -0.0068 0.0046 0.0240
(0.0273) (0.0114) (0.0180) (0.0039) (0.1267)
Years of Exposure to Unsuccessful 
Desegregation Court Litigation*White 0.0107 0.0051 0.0315 -0.0059 -0.0086
(0.0408) (0.0126) (0.0335) (0.0040) (0.1472)
Number of person-year adult observations -- 28,858 72,191 72,191 52,737
Number of individuals 6,307 2,808 6,134 6,134 5,494
Number of childhood families 2,216 1,564 2,185 2,185 2,069
Number of childhood neighborhoods 1,562 1,181 1,546 1,546 1,472
Number of school districts 337 295 335 335 330
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at school district level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Table A2.  Falsification Tests Using Unsuccessful Desegregation Court Litigation:                             
Placebo Effects on Adult Outcomes, by Race
Dependent variable:
All models include race-specific year of birth fixed effects, and controls for region of birth, age (quadratic), gender, and childhood 
family/neighborhood factors. Sample includes original sample PSID children born between 1951-70 who grew up in school districts 
that had desegregation court litigation at some point b/w 1954-90 (desegregation court case data, American Communities Project).  
Results in this table demonstrate that timing of UNSUCCESSFUL court litigation is unrelated to adult attainment outcomes; only 
the timing of initial year of successful litigation that led to court-ordered school desegregation is significantly associated with 
black's adult socioeconomic & health attainments (see Tables 1-6).